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In Sartre’s play Huis Clos, at the outset on his arrival in hell, Garcin sees that it is 
life without a break: the eyelids are fixed and don’t blink, no eye-blink and no sleep. The 
eye-blink (“four thousand little rests per hour) is symbolic of perpetual self-renewal, with 
its regular exits and impromptu returns, which is the structure of human presence in the 
world. The moral of the play is not the cry of Garcin towards the end, “Hell is… other 
people!” It is the horror of human consciousness if it could not break off, if it could not be 
new, if it could only go on reproducing the past, if it were really determined, a fate. 
Garcin’s realization epitomizes Sartre’s description of man’s freedom. We are condemned 
to be free. To exist is to be free. It is a reality that confronts our consciousness and an 
inescapable part of our being.  
Sartre’s idea of freedom is discussed with the greatest detail and virtuoso in Being 
and Nothingness. In his book, freedom is encapsulated in the statement that freedom is 
both absolute and limited. Hence, my exposition and critique of Sartre’s concept of 
freedom in this thesis will be based mainly on Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. My main 
project in this thesis is to explain what I think Sartre means when he states that freedom is 
both absolute and limited. To do this, two types of freedom, ontological and practical 
freedom will be explained.  
Although there are no explicit attempts on the part of Sartre to explain how his 
discussion of the structure of consciousness is related to his discussion of freedom, I will 
in chapters one and two attempt to show how Sartre’s Theory of Freedom is built on and 
stems from Sartre’s discussion of the two aspects of consciousness. In chapter one, I will 
delve quite extensively into pour soi. The structure of pour soi is the starting point of 
iv 
Sartre’s discussion of consciousness. The structure of pour soi will be shown to parallel 
the structure of ontological freedom. Like pour soi, Sartre’s discussion of practical 
freedom or “freedom to obtain” rests on his construction of en soi. The parallel we see in 
the structure of pour soi with ontological freedom and en soi with practical freedom is 
pivotal in our understanding of the two types of freedom Sartre uses extensively to discuss 
freedom. This will be explained in chapter two.  
In Being and Nothingness, freedom is paradoxically stated as both absolute and 
limited. Despite very careful attempts on the part of Sartre to explain how these two 
strands in his theory are compatible and intertwined, many critics accuse Sartre of being 
inconsistent. The Inconsistent Objection will be discussed in chapter three. The 
Inconsistency Objection states that the two counter-intuitive strands in Sartre’s argument 
are inconsistent statements about the same thing. Although the Inconsistency Objection is 
a weak objection against Sartre, it is not my intention to attack its weakness. The 
discussion of the Inconsistency Objection is useful in helping me highlight the 
misconceptions that have enshrouded Sartre’s ontological and practical freedom. These 
misconceptions are a result of not recognizing the different senses in which “absolute” and 
“limited” are used to explain ontological and practical freedom. The complexity of 
Sartre’s terminology will be explained in chapter three.  
The thesis statement of my project will be explained in chapter four. My reading of 
freedom being absolute and limited is “freedom (both ontological and practical) is (both) 
absolute (ontologically) and limited (practically)”. Far too many readers and critics of 
Sartre see ontological freedom and practical freedom in isolation. Hence, the difference 
they see is that ontological freedom is absolute and practical freedom is limited. This is a 
piecemeal understanding of Sartre’s freedom.  
v 
I hope to establish through this thesis that both ontological freedom and practical 
freedom are absolute and limited. This thesis statement brings into sharper focus the idea 
of the interdependence of ontological and practical freedom. The explanation of the two 
types of freedom and their relationship would hopefully render readers of Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness a greater appreciation and more precise understanding of Sartre’s theory 




















1 Sartre’s Theory of Freedom  
 
For Sartre, “choice and consciousness are one and the same thing.”1 Hence, to 
understand Sartre’s theory of freedom we need an understanding of his exposition of 
the structure of consciousness. The freedom of the Sartrean consciousness would be 
synonymous to the freedom that Sartre thinks that man has - to the extent that we are 
all condemned to be free. 
Sartre’s idea of freedom is put forward paradoxically as consciousness that “is 
not what it is and is what it is not.”2 Hence, the discussion of Sartre’s Theory of 
Freedom will be built mainly on the two obvious arguments in this dictum by Sartre. 
Sartre’s two arguments for freedom of the consciousness are: 
1) Consciousness is not what it is 
2) Consciousness is what it is not 3
 
1.1 Consciousness is Not What It is 
 
According to Sartre, Descartes’ Cogito, his insistence that “I think therefore I 
am”, is flawed.4 Such an act of reflection introduces the dualistic view of a reflecting 
and reflected consciousness. We are looking at two consciousnesses here: one doing 
the reflecting and the other the reflected object. The reflected consciousness becomes 
                                                 
1 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1956. Being and Nothingness,  trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Philosophical 
Library, New York, p. 592. Further reference to this book will be denoted as BN, page number. 
2 BN, p. 28 
3 Detmer, David, 1988. Freedom as a Value: a critique of the ethical theory of Jean-Paul Sartre. USA: 
Open Court. p. 6. These two arguments are taken and expounded by David Detmer. Subsequent 
reference to this book will be denoted as Detmer, page number. 
4 Glynn, Simon, 1987. “Introduction – the eye/I of the paradox: Sartre’s view of consciousness” in 
Sartre: An investigation of some major themes. England: Avebury, p.x. Subsequent reference to this 
article will be denoted as Glynn, page number. 
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an object of reflection. Such a reflective operation is “of the second degree”5, “a 
consciousness directed upon consciousness.”6 For Sartre, consciousness is the 
reflecting subject (this point will be elaborated further in this section). The Cartesian 
Cogito is problematic: 
 
It must be remembered that all the writers who have described 
the Cogito have dealt with it as a reflective operation, that is to 
say, as an operation of the second degree. Such a Cogito is 
performed by a consciousness directed upon consciousness, a 
consciousness which takes consciousness as an object…we are 
in the presence of two consciousnesses (a reflecting and a 
reflected consciousness) one of which is conscious of the 
other… Now my reflecting consciousness does not take itself 
for an object when I effect the Cogito. What it affirms 
concerns the reflected consciousness… All reflecting 
consciousness is, indeed, in itself unreflected, and a new act of 
the third degree is necessary in order to posit it.7
  
This act of a second degree reflection is either a process that ends with an unknowable 
subject or it lapses into a slippery slope to ad infinitum. First of all, the reflecting 
subject (“I think”) reflects on the reflected object (the other consciousness or the “I 
am” in Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum). However, this reflection is “impure”8 as the 
subject (reflecting mind) still remains unreflected. According to Sartre, one could stop 
the analysis of consciousness at this nebulous subject or a third term would be 
necessary for the subject (reflecting mind) to be known. The third subject has to be 
outside the second degree consciousness to have knowledge of the second 
consciousness (referred to as the reflecting consciousness but has now become the 
reflected object of the third reflecting subject). A fourth, fifth and infinite number of 
                                                 
5 Sartre, Jean-Paul, (1957) Transcendence of the Ego: An Existential Theory of Consciousness translated 
and introduced by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, New York: Noonday Press. p.45. Subsequent 
reference to this writing will be denoted as TE, page number. 
6 TE, p.44 
7 TE, p. 44-45 
8 This is a term coined by Simon Glynn in his article “Introduction – the eye/I of the paradox: Sartre’s 
view of consciousness”. See his article for further analysis of this concept. 
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consciousnesses are needed for a pure reflection! Sartre summarises this problem in 
Being and Nothingness: 
 
Either we stop at one term of the series – the knower, the 
knower known, the knower known by the knower, etc. In this 
case the totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown; 
that is to say we bump up against a non-self-self-conscious 
reflection as the final term. Or else we affirm the necessity of 
an infinite regress, (idea, ideae, etc.), which is absurd.9
 
To understand Sartre’s free consciousness, it is imperative that the understanding of 
consciousness is not predicated on a subject/object distinction. Consciousness is 
“relegated” into an object. Sartre’s consciousness is not an object. It is free because it 
is the subject of its own reflection. 
Also, consciousness is not a receptacle of things or to put it in the words of the 
“alimentary” psychologists, “consciousness assimilates objects and makes them 
contents of itself.”10 There is no content in our consciousness. All its objects, whether 
physical or mental, perceived or imagined are external to it. In itself, consciousness is 
nothing at all.  
This view of consciousness, according to David Detmer, stems from Sartre’s 
radical interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality. Edmund’s 
doctrine of intentionality states that consciousness is always consciousness of 
something.11  David Detmer sums it up briefly and succinctly: 
 
The point of this principle is that consciousness is always 
directional; that consciousness, in every one of its acts and in 
every one of its modes, always points toward some object. 
Thus, if I see, I see something, if I imagine, I imagine 
                                                 
9 BN, p.1ii 
10 Detmer, p.7 
11 Husserl, Edmund, 1982. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy: First Book, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, #84, p. 199-202. 
“Unconscious” in the quotation above does not refer to one losing his or her consciousness. Detmer is 
explaining Sartre’s idea of the unreflective consciousness. Unreflective consciousness is not aware of 
itself having “awareness”. 
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something; if I question, I question something; and if I am not 
conscious of anything, I am simply unconscious.12
 
Sartre argues for his concept of consciousness in the same vein; that consciousness is 
intentional and it is necessary “for consciousness to exist as consciousness of 
something other than itself.”13 For Husserl, the consciousness has objects of intentions 
while for Sartre, consciousness in itself, is nothing at all. It is nothingness. This radical 
interpretation of the Edmund Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality, according to Sartre, 
has “realistic ontological implications.”14 Husserl’s doctrine, when seen in a different 
light by Sartre, becomes a fundamental platform for Sartre’s first argument that 
“consciousness is not what it is”, and an “instrument for ejecting all contents from 
consciousness.”15
 If our consciousness does not contain or receive knowledge, what is the 
function of our consciousness? Has Sartre constructed a theory that makes 
epistemological inquiry futile or even ludicrous? How can Sartre claim that his idea of 
consciousness has “realistic ontological implications”? As mentioned in the earlier 
paragraph, Sartre’s idea of consciousness is radical. Sartre’s consciousness has no 
“inside”. “It is just this being beyond itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be a 
substance which makes it a consciousness.”16
 How do we know what we know? Sartre explains this by making a 
“realistic” appeal to our experience.  
 
As for things, it is clear that they do not present themselves in 
experience as existing in consciousness. Rather, the tree that I 
see is plainly given as existing “at the side of the road, in the 
                                                 
12 Detmer, p. 7 
13 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1970. Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. 
Joseph P. Fell. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1, No 2 (May 1970: 4-5). Subsequent 
reference to this article will be denoted as Intentionality, page number.  
14 Detmer, p. 7 
15 Detmer, p. 7 
16 Intentionality, p.4 
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midst of the dust, alone and writhing in the heat, eight miles 
from the Mediterranean coast.” This is alone for Sartre a clear 
indication that the tree “could not enter into…consciousness, 
for it is not of the same nature as consciousness.”17
 
When we examine our consciousness to look for the object “tree”, we would have 
found a shadowy and obscure “realm.” However, the realm of objects “presents 
themselves with a degree of clarity, solidity, and sheer massive obtrusiveness that has 
no analogue in our experience of our own consciousness.”18
 Consciousness, as conceived by Sartre is a process of “shooting out” toward 
and revealing the objects. Consciousness is not a thing that assimilates objects or 
knowledge when it confronts them, it is “the quick, obscure image of a burst.” Thus, 
“to know is to burst toward.”19 Consciousness is not a thing. It is intentional. 
Consciousness itself is intentionality. “To know is to know something; but this means, 
not that consciousness does the knowing but that consciousness in this instance is the 
act of knowing.”20 Hence, Sartre’s consciousness is to be seen as a verb as “human 
reality is action” in “human reality…being is reduced to doing.”21
 
1.1.1 Transphenomenality and the Independence of Sartre’s Consciousness 
 
In Sartre’s interpretation of intentionality, the intended objects of 
consciousness are not constituted by, but are rather independent of it.22 If the being of 
                                                 
17 Detmer, p.8 
18 Detmer, p. 8 
19 Intentionality, p. 4 
20 Detmer, p. 9 
21 BN, p. 476 
22 The being of objects of intentionality is called being-in-itself (l’ être-en-soi). Unlike being-for-itself 
(l’être-pour-soi), that is always conscious of something and a revealing intuition of a transcendent being, 
being-in-itself exists independent of consciousness. It is the “simple”, “undifferentiated”, “paste of 
things” apprehended by Roquentin in Nausea. 
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the object is not constituted by the consciousness, how does the agent perceive the 
appearance of the object? 
The phenomenon of transphenomenality answers the question. Roquentin, the 
protagonist in Sartre’s Nausea is the most profound mouthpiece for this view. While 
sitting on a park bench, Roquentin looks at all the things (being-it-self) before him in 
the park and all at once he sees everything differently, everything as a single thing – 
“Suddenly existence had revealed itself (being for-itself).”23 Words had vanished and 
the points of reference which men used to give meaning to things also vanished. What 
Roquentin saw was “the paste of things”, “the root [of the tree], the park gates, the 
bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, 
were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous 
masses, all the disorder – naked.”24 What does Sartre mean by seeing things as a 
“single thing” or the “paste of things” stripped of its veneer? One would be seriously 
misguided if this message were to be read as describing an existence, a background 
that goes beyond what one can see and perceive. The Kantian idea of the phenomena 
and noumena world would be vehemently rejected by Sartre. Instead, Sartre’s claim is 
that: 
 
…the being of an existent is exactly what it appears… [The 
phenomenon] does not point over its shoulder to a true being 
that would be, for it, absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it 
reveals itself as it is. The phenomenon can be studied and 
described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself.25
 
I will be drawing out two premises from this quotation to explain Sartre’s phenomenon 
of transphenomenality.  
                                                 
23 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1964. Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions. p.171 
24 Nausea, p. 171 
25 BN, p. x1vi 
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1) The being of the existent is exactly what it appears as it is not an inference but 
something that is “overwhelmingly and irreducibly real.”26
2) The being of the existent is “absolutely indicative of itself” and does not admit of 
the distinction between “object-as-experienced and object-as-existing.”27
 The first premise stems from Sartre’s disagreement with Husserl’s famous 
procedure of “phenomenological reduction.” The point of this approach is to study 
everything as it appears to the conscious mind as an intentional object (or a goal). The 
actual existence of the object must be kept in abeyance or “bracketed” as “any 
experience, however extensive, leaves open the possibility that what is given does not 
exist.”28 According to Husserl, such a phenomenological analysis is necessary as one 
can only be sure that he/she has experienced the object, one cannot be certain about its 
existence. “Thus, while I know that I see a desk, for this is an absolute datum, I can 
only conjecture that there is a desk, for this is a matter of contingent fact which is 
affirmed only by going beyond what is strictly given in experience.”29
 Sartre rejects this reduction. The being of the existent is indeed the datum of 
our experience. The objects of our perceptual experience clearly do present themselves 
as overwhelmingly and irreducibly real.  
 The second premise is established based on the assumption of Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction. To “bracket” the actual existence of objects is to say that 
there is a difference between object-as-experienced and object-as-existing. Although 
Husserl does not use the terms “object-as-experienced” and “object-as-existing” 
explicitly, the point of contention for Sartre here is that the implied acknowledgement 
of a possible noumenal realm is something Sartre would deny. For Sartre, the “datum 
                                                 
26 Detmer, p. 11 
27 Detmer, p. 11 
28 Husserl, Edmund, 1982. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy: First Book, trans. F Kersten The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, #84, p. 199-202. 
29 Detmer, p. 10 
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of experience” does not move beyond the plane of phenomena, it is a series of 
comprehensive and unified appearance of the intended object. David Detmer explains 
it clearly in the following passage: 
 
…the desk that I now see is the same desk that I would see if I 
were to look at it through rose-colored glasses, or move it to 
my right, or turn it upside down, or cut off one of its legs. 
Indeed, if I were conscious of the desk only through one of its 
attributes, say, its uprightness, in abstraction from all its other 
perceivable aspects, I would not be conscious of a desk at all, 
but only of the property “uprightness.” Thus, since I most 
certainly am conscious of a desk, I must be identifying the 
desk with a series of its appearances; and since this series 
cannot be limited to a finite number – there are always 
additional perspectives from which to perceive an object – the 
desk must be identified with the infinite series of its possible 
appearances.30
 
One might be quick to accuse Sartre of circularity. First of all, existence is the 
uninferred, irreducible phenomenon of the being of any existent. We cannot move 
beyond the plane of the phenomena. Then, Sartre rejects the object-as-experienced and 
object-as-existing distinction on the ground that the existence of the world is exactly 
what they appear (the phenomena). Sartre has merely stayed on one plane and Husserl 
might still have a point in asserting that existence needs to be “bracketed” as Sartre has 
not removed the possibility of another unexperienced and unperceived object that lurks 
in the noumenal realm.  
 Sartre does equate being with the phenomena but the central point here is “the 
being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears.”31 Going back to 
the example of the desk, my single perception of its property of “uprightness” does not 
mean that the “woodenness” of the desk transcends the phenomena realm. The being 
or reality of the desk here is equated with an infinite series of appearances, rather than 
a single appearance. “The object always surpasses not only our individual experiences 
                                                 
30 Detmer, p. 13 
31 Detmer, p. 12 
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of it but also our knowledge of it (since there are always more perspectives from which 
to observe it).”32 This is Sartre’s idea of the transphenomenal being of the object; that 
our experience of it transcends not the realm of the phenomena but any finite series of 
its appearance.  
Now that Sartre has rejected Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and 
replaced it with his idea of the phenomenon of transphenomenality, how is the 
independence of consciousness from the existence of objects established from here? 
How does Sartre reject the “idealistic” thesis that “consciousness is constitutive of the 
being of its object?”33
According to David Detmer, Sartre employs a “regressive” argument34 in his 
phenomenological description. What this means is that in presenting his analysis of a 
phenomenon, Sartre typically regresses back to what is experienced in real life. Going 
back to the example of the desk, what is directly given in one’s experience or a 
particular phenomenon of the desk is perhaps the “woodenness.” But when referring to 
the infinite series of its appearances (transphenomenality of the phenomena), one has 
to appeal to real beings existing outside of consciousness.  
This same view is sharpened in Sartre’s The Psychology of Imagination.35 He 
ends his analysis of the difference between perception and imagination with the 
assumption that perceived objects exist. The being of the object (being-in-itself) is not 
constituted by consciousness, it exists apart from consciousness and this is evidenced 
by its “coefficient of resistance.”36 This means that objects possess a “certain stubborn 
                                                 
32 Detmer, p. 13 
33 Detmer, p. 14 
34 Detmer, p. 14 
35 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1968. The Psychology of Imagination, trans. Bernard Frechtman. New York: 
Washington Press. 
36 See The Psychology of Imagination for Sartre’s detailed analysis of this concept. 
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obtrusiveness”37 that cannot be altered at will by my consciousness. Unlike objects of 
imagination that can be called to mind and changed, perceived objects resist any 
attempt to change it. This “being” that acts against my consciousness cannot be 
constituted by consciousness. 
The concept of facticity seen in The Psychology of Imagination38 further 
supports the existence of the being of perceived objects. Facticity is the “primary and 
irreducible fact which presents itself as a contingent and irrational specification of the 
noematic essence of the world.”39 While our consciousness can shape the patterns of 
experience, one cannot shape the fact of the world, the “factical dimension of our 
experience.”40
 
1.1.2 The Transcendence of the Ego 
  
Sartre purports a “non-egological”41 conception of the consciousness. By 
negating the ego or the consciousness as “non-egological”, Aron Gurwitsch has 
accurately identified Sartre’s intention to repudiate theories of the existence of an ego 
or “I” in our consciousness. The seemingly commonsensical utterance of “I think”, “I 
see” or “I hope” mistakenly points one to a perceiving subject (consciousness) 
observing and contemplating the actions of the objects that consciousness perceives. 
This view posits consciousness firstly as something that can be known intuitively 
(Husserl) and secondly, as necessary for unifying our thoughts/ consciousness (Husserl, 
Descartes and Kant). Hence in this section that explains what Sartrean consciousness is 
                                                 
37 Detmer, p. 15 
38 Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Psychology of Imgaination, trans. Bernard Frechtman. New York: Washington 
Square Press, 1968. 
39 Ibid, p. 233 
40 Detmer, p. 15 
41 Aron, Gurwitsch, “A Non-egological Conception of Consciousness,” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol. 1, 1940-1, p. 325-38. Reprinted in Aron Gurwitsch, Studies in 
Phenomenology and Psychology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, III., 1966. 
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not, it will be seen that Sartre’s attempt to “expel things from consciousness and to re-
establish its true connection with the world”42 is twofold: First, Sartre denies Husserl’s 
claim that the transcendental ego (subject) is present to intuition. Second, I will 
examine Sartre’s attempt to show that the “I” or a transcendental ego is not necessary 
for unifying consciousness.  
 Firstly, Sartre’s argument is that Husserl and Descartes cannot support the 
existence of a transcendental ego43 by appealing to intuitive evidence. The existence of 
“I” is not given in experience. As seen earlier in this section, all consciousness for 
Sartre and Husserl, is consciousness of an object. The objects of consciousness are 
external, outside consciousness. The objects of consciousness are perceived by what 
Sartre calls pre-reflective (non-positional) consciousness where consciousness 
becomes aware of its own consciousness. Consciousness is not objectified as a thing or 
subject but becomes aware of its being. It realises its being-for-itself (pour soi).44  
Reflective consciousness is positional. Guided by the project formed, it posits its 
object as “this” or “that”. These become the objects of our reflective consciousness 
that possess meaning as directed by consciousness’s Fundamental Project. 
 
In ordinary prereflective experience Sartre said there is (a) 
positional consciousness of an object and (b) nonpositional 
awareness (of) the act of consciousness but no consciousness 
of an ego. Sartre claimed that an ego was encountered only in 
                                                 
42BE, p. li 
43 In my discussion of the transcendental ego that Sartre is trying to expel from consciousness, the term 
“transcendental ego” has been used interchangeably to refer to the subject of consciousness in Husserl 
and Descartes’ philosophy. I have chosen to use “transcendental ego” in this way to refer to the subject 
that Sartre rejects in Husserl and Descartes’ philosophy. Strictly speaking, Descartes has not used the 
term “transcendental ego” to refer to the “I” in his thinking consciousness. Descartes’ philosophy is not 
part of the transcendental tradition.  
44 Consciousness however is not synonymous with being-for-self even though Sartre uses these two 
terms interchangeably. Sartre calls consciousness a “nonsubstantial absolute” as it is not associated with, 
and cannot be known as an entity that is substantial. It is “pure appearance” as it exists only to the 
degree that it appears. It is total emptiness. With awareness of its being, consciousness is known as a 
being-for-itself, a being that carries a lack of being at its heart due to the presence of nihilating. Hazel E. 
Barnes on page 16 of her article, “Sartre’s ontology: The revealing and making of being” makes the 
comment that though different, this does not mean that consciousness and being-for-itself are two 
existences. “Neither consciousness nor being-for-itself exists separately from the other”.  
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acts of reflection. Reflective consciousness has the same dual 
structure as prereflective consciousness; there is (a) positional 
consciousness of an object and (b) nonpositional 
consciousness (of) the act of reflecting.45
 
Two questions arise. Since the prereflective consciousness and the reflective 
consciousness both possess the same structure, what is the difference between the two? 
According to Simon Glynn, Sartre’s distinction here is that of “the nature of the 
objects”46 of the prereflective and reflective consciousness. The objects of 
consciousness appear when the reflective consciousness “turns back” on the previous 
activity of the consciousness. On the other hand, without the need of a prior reflection, 
anything can be an object of the prereflective consciousness. Sartre’s opposition to 
Descartes will further sharpen the definition of these two types of reflection. 
Descartes’ “I” is indubitable, it is the foundation of all other knowledge. Existence is 
sure because “I” is always present when we turn on our thought or reflects. While I 
may doubt the correctness of my thought (that the oasis I see in front of me is a 
hallucination, the colours around me are imaginary etc.), I cannot doubt the fact that 
“I” am the one doing the thinking or doubting. For Descartes, “I” is the 
epistemological bulwark of existence.  
For Sartre, “I” is like all other external objects. They present themselves as 
objects of consciousness and consciousness becomes aware of them upon reflection. 
Consciousness, as Sartre maintains, is nothingness or has “no content.”47 Reformulated 
in the light of Sartre’s philosophy, the Cogito Ergo Sum should be, “I am not, therefore 
I think.”48 Sartre’s objection to this claim is that it has given “illegitimate priority to 
reflection, which in fact is a secondary reflection.”49 In the primary stage of reflection 
                                                 
45 Glynn, p. 2  
46 Glynn, p. 2 
47 BN, p. li 
48 Blackham, H.J., 1961. Six Existentialist Thinkers. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, p. 113. 
49 Detmer, p. 18 
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or the pre-reflective stage, the “I” is not there. When I am not “engaged” with my 
thoughts, my consciousness is entirely directed towards and bound with the object of 
my thought. “I” appears when I subsequently take a step back and reflect on my 
consciousness. “I” “is brought into existence”50 by reflection: 
 
There is no I on the unreflected level. When I run after a 
streetcar, when I look at the same time, when I am absorbed in 
contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness 
of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc… In fact, I am 
then plunged into the world of objects, it is they which 
constitute the unity of my consciousness; it is they which 
present themselves with values, with attractive and repellent 
qualities – but me, I have disappeared… There is no place for 
me on this level. And this is not a matter of chance, due to a 
momentary lapse of attention, but happens because of the very 
structure of consciousness.51
 
Hence, “I” is the object we become aware of upon reflection. It is “not the 
transcendental Ego which Husserl and Descartes believed was the experienced subject 
of human consciousness.”52
 According to Phyllis Sutton Morris, to understand the “I” or ego that Sartre is 
rejecting, it is imperative that we understand the ways the word “transcendent” is used 
by Sartre, without which, Sartre’s claims remain obscure. Morris thinks there are three 
possible definitions of “transcendent”, transcendence” and “transcendental”. To have a 
better understanding of these three terms, he contrasts them with Kant’s use of 
“transcendent” and “transcendental”.  
1) Transcendence for Sartre refers not to the object but the acts of consciousness; “its  
    capacity to go beyond what is given (facticity) in order to desire, imagine, or  
pursue a goal not given.”53  
                                                 
50 Detmer, p. 18 
51 TE, p. 48-49 
52 Morris, Phyllis Sutton, 1987. “Sartre on the transcendence of the ego” in Sartre: An investigation of 
some major themes. England: Avebury, p. 3. Further reference to this article will be denoted as Morris, 
page number. 
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 2) The ego is a transcendental object for others, as well as a transcendent object  
for my own consciousness.54 What Sartre is saying here is that the ego, as the 
transcendental subject, is also an object of consciousness. This is in contrary to 
Kant’s idea of the transcendental subject55 that is immanent and resides in 
consciousness. Sartre rejects this view. Sartre repudiates this Kantian idea of the 
immanent transcendental subject as it implies an object’s inherent existence in 
consciousness. Sartre’s consciousness has no content. “The ego is not the owner 
(subject) of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness.”56
 
3) Most objects are transcendent in that they are transphenomenal. “The object does  
not just disappear [as an image might] when we cease being conscious of it; it is  
given to us as transcending or temporally exceeding our present experience of it.  
The ego, which is a transcendental object [as seen in 2] is also a transcendent object  
[as seen in 3].”57 For Kant, the transcendent object is totally beyond our experience. 
Hence, it is unknowable. 
 
Hence, we have seen here that transcendence for Sartre refers to the consciousness’s 
capacity to go beyond facticity to pursue what it desires. The transphenomenality or 
infinite patterns (likened to notes and melodies that make up a piece of music) of 
                                                                                                                                             
53 Morris, p. 3. It is also important to note here that this sense of “transcendence” used by Sartre is 
different from Kant’s. For Kant, transcendence is associated with the transcendent object that belongs to 
the noumena realm that is beyond our experience. These transcendent objects are unknowable. Sartre is 
concentrating on the characteristic of consciousness; on its activity of transcending facticity. 
54 Morris, p. 4 
55 For Kant, “transcendent” refers to objects that are wholly beyond our experience. These objects are 
unknowable. “Transcendental” is used to refer to the idea that the apperceiving subject could never be, 
like a transcendent object, the object of experience. The apperceiving subject is transcendental as it is a 
necessary condition of all possible experience. It is inherent or residing in consciousness. This is not a 
characteristic shared by transcendent objects.  
56 TE, p. 97 
57 Morris, p. 4. Please refer to my earlier discussion on the transphenomenality of objects in this chapter. 
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appearance are directed by the Fundamental Project I am pursuing. Also, the 
transcendent ego is not an immanent object residing in consciousness, but an object of 
consciousness. Sartre further expounds on this by saying that the transcendent ego is 
an object that others can know as the knowing takes place in public.58 Finally, the 
transcendence of objects refers to the transphenomenality of objects; “objects which 
are given as temporally exceeding the present appearance.”59 This refers to the past, 
present and future reflections of the transcendent ego. It is always in a state of “not-to-
be” when encountered by the consciousness. Morris summarises Sartre’s idea of the 
transcendent ego succinctly in the following: 
 
It is not the subject of experience. Nor is it a substance, either 
immaterial or psychophysical. It is, rather, a synthetic ideal 
object, comparable in some respects to a melody which is 
composed of separate notes standing in a certain relation to 
each other and forming a recognisable pattern… no ego is at 
all found in prereflective consciousness and an ego is 
discovered as an object for reflective consciousness, but it is 
not a transcendental subject; rather, it is a transcendent object, 
which turns out to be a continuing pattern of actions, states, 
and qualities.60
 
The transcendent ego is an object of consciousness, not in consciousness and it 
becomes extremely problematic to consider the ego a subject. It leads to an infinite 
regress.61 For the ego to be an object of consciousness, we direct our attention 
(intentionality) on towards ourselves, we “distance” or “disassociate” ourselves and 
“see ourselves as others see us”. This is how the “I” appear to us in our reflection. 
Hence, this is how Sartre attacks the appeal to intuitive evidence to support the 
existence of a transcendent ego in our consciousness.  
                                                 
58 TE, p. 104 
59 Morris, p. 4 
60 Morris, p. 4 & 5 
61 This point has been explained earlier in this chapter.  
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 The next strategy Sartre uses to expel the ego from consciousness is to show 
that it is not necessary to posit a transcendent ego to account for the unity of 
experience. According to Morris, Sartre attempts two explicit methods of accounting 
for the unity of experience and these strategies do not necessitate the positing of a 
transcendental ego. However, this does not preclude the admission of an ego for Sartre 
because, as seen earlier in this chapter, he does admit of the awareness of an “I” in 
reflective consciousness. Contrary to Husserl, Sartre rejects that there can be intuitive 
evidence for consciousness as a subject that unifies our consciousness. The role of  
\consciousness is reversed for Sartre. It is not the case that it is the “I” we encounter in 
consciousness that unifies all the representation of external objects, rather, the “I” is 
made possible by the “synthetic unity of our representations.”62 Sartre’s explanation of 
the “synthetic unity of our representation” is pivotal in rejecting the status of the “I” as 
an apprehending subject. How does consciousness, not as a subject, synthesize our 
representations? The following are the two ways.  
 Sartre’s first strategy involves his agreement with Husserl in the view that 
“consciousness unifies itself in time.”63 ‘It is a consciousness which unifies itself, 
concretely, by a play of “transversal” intentionalities which are concrete and real 
retentions of past consciousnesses… Whoever says “a consciousness” says “the whole 
of consciousness”, and this singular property belongs to consciousness itself?’64 The 
play of the transversal intentionalities can be explained in Sartre’s example of counting 
in Being and Nothingness.65 The case adduced as an example is that while one is 
engrossed in counting, consciousness becomes aware of itself when someone comes 
                                                 
62 Detmer, p. 17. Phra Thepsophon terms this unity of our consciousness or structured moments 
“ekstatic unity” to explain the same idea that the three temporal dimension, viz. past, present and future, 
is not comprised of discrete moments but seen as a totality. Like Detmer, the unity seen here is made 
possible by the inner structure of consciousness; the transphenomenal reflections of consciousness. This 
point will be further compared and elaborated in the subsequent section “existence precedes essence”. 
63 Morris, p. 7 
64 TE, p. 39 
65 BN, p. xxxix 
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along and “awakens” you from the pre-reflective state of the act of counting. Your 
response is an indication of consciousness’s ability to instantaneously reflect on the act 
of counting. However, it is clear that the reflection is not of a moment, not the point 
when you drew out a coin to be added to the rest of the collection you have. Your 
awareness at that instant is “your instantaneous reflective awareness of what you are 
currently doing as a part of a series of acts amounting to the activity of counting.”66 
This also implies that this series is already etched and retained in your consciousness. 
Although your reflection is of a moment, it carries with it the whole or synthesized act 
of counting. Hence, it could be seen that the reflected series of representations are 
already present in consciousness even before it is reflected upon. This is evidence of 
the synthetic unity and “nonthetic” nature of our consciousness. Sartre explains: 
 
It is the nonthetic consciousness of counting which is the very 
condition of my act of adding. If it were otherwise, how could 
the addition be a unifying theme of my consciousness? In 
order that this theme should preside over a whole series of 
syntheses of unifications and recognitions it must be present to 
itself, not as a thing but as an operative intentionality which 




Hence, Sartre’s argument in the passage is that implied in the act of counting (the pre-
reflective awareness of consciousness) is a “non-thetic memory” of each representation 
of the act of counting. The intentional act of reflection invokes the “prethetic memory 
of previous acts – thus unifying them all.”68 The important point here is that while one 
is counting, each stage or the play of traversal intentionalities of counting is already 
                                                 
66 Agrawal, M.M., 1992. Consciousness and the Integrated Being, Indian Institute of Advanced Study; 
Shimla. National Publishing House, New Delhi. p. 16. Subsequent reference to this book will be denoted 
as Agrawal, page number. 
67 BN, p. xxxix 
68 Agrawal, p. 16 
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present, “though not explicitly but only pre-reflectively.”69 The transversal 
intentionalities work in such a way that each act of consciousness has a “non-cognitive 
awareness not only of itself but also of another.”70 To conclude, Sartre’s first way of 
explaining the unity of consciousness is that the synthesis and unity of representation 
can be explained from within (the pre-reflective stage of reflection). Therefore, the 
necessity of the transcendental ego to unify the reflections of consciousness is 
repudiated.  
 Sartre’s second method for explaining the unity of experience is to show that, 
like Kant, the synthesis we see in the objects in experience is a result of the “focus” of 
each separate act of consciousness. The focus given confers upon our experience a 
sense of continuity. Agrawal explains this enduring sense of continuity as 
consciousness’s attempts at realising a “Fundamental Project”, therefore, the separate 
consciousnesses share a common end. “Human reality, Sartre tells us, is a being which 
is originally a project and which is defined by its end.”71 The number of separate acts 
in our consciousness is united by the focus of project or common end that they share. 
Those that share the same project will inadvertently unite into the respective 
“tributaries”, distinguished from other tributaries because they are all ‘hierarchically 
related manifestations of a Fundamental Project by which I individuate a single 
“tributary” of acts from the otherwise unindividuated “river” of all conscious acts.’ 72
 In sum, consciousness is indeed nothingness and without content, not even an 
apprehending subject known as the transcendental ego. This is so as firstly, the 
Husserlian appeal to experience or intuition as evidence for the transcendental ego is to 
be rejected. “Only objects of consciousness are given in full intuitive presence.” As an 
                                                 
69 Agrawal, p. 16-17 
70 Agrawal, p. 17 
71 Agrawal, p. 17 
72 Glynn, p. xxvi. 
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object of consciousness, the transcendental ego is external and appears in reflection 
although it does not appear in pre-reflective consciousness. Secondly, the appeal to a 
transcendental ego as a subject that unifies our experience is superfluous as  
consciousness unifies itself in a play of “transversal” intentionalities that unifies 
themselves according to the “Fundamental Project” each of these acts of consciousness 
pursues. Hence, the transcendental ego is not in Sartre’s interpretation of our 
consciousness, “the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is 
outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another.”73
 
1.2 Consciousness is What It is Not 
 
The essential characteristics of consciousness are the capacities or its activities 
such as perceiving, remembering, imagining, judging, willing etc. What is meant by 
“consciousness is what it is not” refers to the negating activities. ‘It is through such 
“nihilating” activities such as imagining, doubting, abstracting, questioning, denying 
etc. that non-being emerges in the world.’74 Nihilating is the intentional act of 
consciousness that involves “a pure and simple negation of the given”75 in favour of 
what is not a given. In other words, while apprehending the transphenomenal being of 
external objects, consciousness’s awareness always surpasses the given; ‘a process of 
nihilating the “given” in order to realize what is not yet present.’76 For example when 
one sees a figure in a distance, one realises not just the figure but that it stands out 
against a background that it is not.  
                                                 
73 TE, p. 31 
74 Detmer, p. 25 
75 BN, p. 478 
76 Agrawal, p. 13 
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The transphenomenality of the perceived object also applies to consciousness 
itself. This happens when consciousness reflectively becomes aware of its own identity 
as being “conscious-of” (being-for-itself). This is what Sartre means by “a double 
nihilation of the being which it is (being-in-itself) and the being in the midst of which it 
is.”77 Consciousness recognises that it as an object in the world and upon reflection 
knows that it cannot be cognised. The elusive “subject” or consciousness is 
“intentionally inexistent.”78 It is not a material or tangible subject. Simon Glynn 
explains the idea of “double nihilation” as consciousness finding itself “both of the 
world of objects in the midst of which it finds itself, and of Itself as the reified object 
that, at any moment, it may erroneously appear to be.”79 Hence, “consciousness is a 
pure and simple negation of the given, and it exists as the disengagement from a 
certain existing given and as an engagement toward a certain not yet existing end.”80 It 
is with this understanding of the ontological structure that Sartre refers to 
consciousness “as being what it is not and not being what it is.”81 To have a better 
grasp of the act of nihilation of Sartre’s consciousness, we will need to understand the 
nature of these negating activities of consciousness. These activities include 





                                                 
77 BN, p. 486 
78 This is a term coined by Brentano, and Agrawal uses it in his discussion of Sartre’s idea of 
consciousness. Brentano uses this term in response to Sartre’s notion that to be conscious is to be 
directed at something. Brentano adds that the object of consciousness can be something that does not 
exist at the moment of the intentional act.  
79 Glynn, p. xxxiii 
80 BN, p. 14 
81BN. p. 1xv 
82 The discussion here is based on the same ideas raised by Detmer in his book, Freedom as a Value: a 




To be conscious is to be always conscious of something, but the intentional 
object of consciousness “need not exist rerum natura.”83 In fact the experience of an 
imagined or absent object is the essential characteristic of Sartre’s transphenomenal 
objects of consciousness. The imagined object is “posited as non-existent or as absent 
or as existing elsewhere or not posited as existing.”84 The imagined object is different 
from the object of perception because “the image involves a certain nothingness.”85 
The following example from Detmer will illustrate the point: 
 
Let us consider an example. When I open my guitar case and 
look inside, my guitar immediately presents itself with that 
certain obtrusiveness, that “resistance,” which characterises 
objects of perception. I encounter the guitar; I experience it as 
being present, really existing out there in the world. Now 
suppose that, having lent my guitar to a neighbour, I go back 
and reopen its case. I now experience the absence of the 
guitar…the guitar is encountered as a negativity as an 
objective correlate of my negative act. Thus, the image of the 
guitar like all images, is given with “a certain nothingness.”86
 
The absence of the guitar encountered is a negativity, a correlate of the negative act of 
not seeing the guitar in the case. However, the notion of absence here must be made 
with reference to the reflection of a previous reflected object. Absence is encountered 
as a result of the experience of its presence in an earlier episode. This absence of the 
guitar is different from an infinite number of things I do not experience or see at that 
moment – unicorns, pink elephants etc. This absence is felt because my   
consciousness (as it imagines) has posited the absence of the guitar with a reference to 
its previous presence.  Imagination of the absence of the guitar illustrates the point that 
                                                 
83 Agrawal, p. 9 
84 The Psychology of Imagination, p. 238 
85 ibid, p. 16 
86 ibid, p. 26 
 21
consciousness is intentional. We are always conscious of something, even if the object 
is not present. The object that is not around is then posited as “not existing.” It is a 
“certain nothingness” as its previous “obtrusive resistance” is negated.  
 Also, while the intentional object is experienced via perception, consciousness 
is able to imagine the image of the absent object as it is “able to escape from the world 
by its very nature.” It is “able by its own efforts withdraw from the world. In a word, it 
must be free.”87 Freedom here refers firstly to consciousness’s ability to call to mind 
and alter at will the imagined object. The imagined object is free from the “coefficient 
of resistance” of the perceived object (guitar). Secondly, unlike the perceived object, 
the image is not subjected to strict causality. The perception of the guitar is causally 
linked to consciousness as the presence of the perceived object is “guaranteed” before 
consciousness.88 Every reflection of the guitar is a result of a perception of it and the 
guitar is transphenomenal; “it gives itself as a source of an infinite number of 
perspectivally distinct perceptions.” 89 What we see is a direct result of the encountered 
perceptual object. However, as seen earlier, this does not mean that the perceived 
object originated in consciousness. Like the imagined object, all objects are external to 
consciousness. As an image, what we call to mind is not strictly caused by what we see 
i.e. the perception of an empty guitar case. It is still possible, when we turn our 
attention from the guitar case, to imagine the absence of the guitar. Since the perceived 
object and image do not originate from my consciousness, we cannot say that the free 
act of consciousness (that only applies to the imagined object) has created the absence. 
“I can experience my guitar’s absence only if it really is absent.”90   
                                                 
87 Detmer, p. 26 
88 Detmer, p. 27 
89 Detmer, p. 27 
90 Detmer, p. 27 
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Hence, to conclude the discussion on one of the nihilating behaviours of 
consciousness, we have seen that the free act of consciousness is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the appearance of an absence or a negativity. ‘[A]t least it is 





 Sartre begins his description of the next example of a nihilating act in the 
following hyperbolic expression.  
 
[M]an is the only being by whom a destruction can be 
accomplished… It is man who destroys his cities through the 
agency of earthquakes… (and) who destroys his ships through 
the agency of cyclones.92
 
According to Detmer, the key point to note in this rather preposterous claim is that 
Sartre is making a “conceptual” rather than a “causal” claim.93 Detmer is trying to 
explain that Sartre is not, in the passage above, absurdly undermining the prowess of 
Nature, nor is Sartre arguing that natural disasters are illusory or mere ideas.94 Rather, 
the “destruction” that Sartre is referring to is the power of consciousness to nihilate the 
consequence of the disaster by recalling what is not (the bustling city of Bam, Iran, 
before the onslaught of the earthquake) and by “comparing it to the present as that 
which is no longer.”95  It must also be added here that destruction or the act of 
nihilation by consciousness, not the pulverised physical environment, is only possible 
                                                 
91 Detmer, p. 27 
92 BN, p. 8-9 
93 Detmer, p. 28 
94 Detmer, p. 28 
95 Detmer, p. 28 
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for a free consciousness. Since destruction is made possible by the freedom of 




 The phenomenon of interrogation consists of three distinct negativities which 
reveal the nihilating capacity of consciousness. The first negativity is ignorance. 
Interrogation involves the asking of questions and it presupposes ignorance on the part 
of the questioner. Ignorance is manifested in thoughts such as “I do not know whether 
the reply will be negative or affirmative.” Sartre calls this nihilating act “the non-being 
of knowledge in man.”96  
 Secondly, for the questioner, there is always the “permanent objective 
possibility of a negative reply.”97 Sartre calls this “the possibility of non-being in 
transcendental being.”98 The third negativity is the “not otherwise” implied in every 
affirmative answer given. For example, when asked whether I am a Singaporean, the 
affirmative “yes, I am” also implies that “I am a Singaporean and not Malaysian.” This 
negativity reveals the nihilating capacity of consciousness.  
 Again, interrogation together with its associated negativities, are proofs of 
freedom. In fact, Sartre concludes that these negativities can only be explained on the 
assumption of freedom: 
 
It is essential…that the questioner have the permanent 
possibility of disassociating himself from the causal series 
which constitutes being and which can produce only being. If 
we admitted that the question is determined in the questioner 
by universal determinism, the question would thereby become 
                                                 
96 BN, p. 5 
97 BN, p. 5 
98 BN, p. 5 
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unintelligible and even inconceivable…Thus in so far as the 
questioner must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a 
kind of nihilating withdrawal, he is not subject to the causal 





For Sartre, the act of perception should not be misconstrued as the passive 
activity ‘in which physical objects or “data” given off by them, are directly recorded in 
all their positivity by consciousness. Clearly, such a view differs radically from 
Sartre’s, since it recognises neither the activity nor the negativity of consciousness in 
perception.”100 As seen from the outset of Sartre’s arguments for the freedom of 
consciousness, to be conscious is to be conscious of something, the role of 
consciousness must be an active one. Even consciousness in its pre-reflected stage is 
engaged in perceiving an object. The passive reception of the data offered by objects is 
also another way of saying “what I perceive is completely determined by such factors 
as the physical feature of the objects in front of me and the light rays which reach my 
eyes.”101 This cannot be accepted by Sartre especially when we make reference to the 
idea of the transphenomenality of objects. The transversal perception of an intentional 
object is always that of a being reaching a possibility and negating a prior perception. 
This infinite series of traversal perceptions preclude determinism and, as seen in the 
previous section, Sartre says that the question, (and in this case object) is unintelligible 
and even inconceivable.”  
The following example will illustrate that firstly, consciousness is active and 
secondly, its activity is always that of recognising something is and is not (nihilation). 
                                                 
99 BN, p. 23 
100 Detmer, p. 29 
101 Detmer, p. 30 
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Let us consider the example of “singling out” a piece of paper on a desk. The “singling 
out” of the piece of paper is the active act of consciousness, not an imposed or 
determined perception of the paper (or of other items on the table) by my passive 
consciousness. My ability to shift my focus from one object to another randomly 
attests to the fact that my perceptions are free and not determined. The consciousness 
of something or the intentionality of consciousness separates consciousness from the 
object of consciousness. Hence, the free activity of consciousness is implicit in the 
“consciousness” part of the equation.102
Secondly, the active perceptions of consciousness are always accompanied by 
nihilation. In the example of singling out the piece of paper, the selection of the 
perception results in the piece of paper standing out from the rest of the items on the 
desk while the rest pales into the background. They have been nihilated into 
nothingness that “envelops”103 the sheet of paper. Another way of expressing the 
nihilation is also to say that the piece of paper is not the stapler, paper-cutter, ruler etc. 
“Being-in-itself without regard to consciousness, is simple and undifferentiated 
mass.”104 Hence, the freedom of consciousness is seen (or needed) here as the mind not 
only actively singles out items to be presented to consciousness, it is also actively 
negating each intentional object of consciousness. To conclude, positive or negative 





                                                 
102 Detmer, p. 30 
103 Detmer, p. 30 
104 Detmer, p. 30 
105 Cf. Dagfinn Føllesdal, 1981. “Sartre on Freedom” in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, ed. Paul 
Arthur Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. p. 392 – 407. 
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 1.2.5 The Experience of Absence 
 
According to Detmer, “the relationship between freedom and nihilating acts of 
consciousness can perhaps be seen most clearly in the phenomenon of absence.”106 
Sartre illustrates this point in Being and Nothingness using the example of the absence 
of Pierre at the café. The negativity appears when the person looking for Pierre does 
not see Pierre and concludes that “Pierre is not here.” There are four points that should 
be noted in this example.  
Firstly, negativity is an act of consciousness. Unable to “single out” Pierre, the 
absence of Pierre is felt. The café and the environment contain no negativities as they 
are not objects intended by consciousness. In fact, “the café is a fullness of being.”107
Secondly, the search for Pierre upon arrival is evidence for the fact that the 
world cannot determine what one sees. For Sartre, other than the intentional object of 
consciousness, the organisation of the café is “an original nihilation.”108 While 
searching for Pierre from the myriad of objects in the environment, these objects are 
only given “marginal attention”. “Each element of the setting, a person, a table; a chair, 
attempts to isolate itself, to lift itself upon the ground constituted by the totality of the 
other objects, only to fall back once more into the undifferentiated objects of this 
ground; it melts109 into the ground.”110 Attention is given to the “ground” in so far as 
consciousness nihilates objects that are not Pierre in its search for Pierre. Hence, the 
“neutral” (not intentional) nature of the ground is the “necessary condition for the 
                                                 
106 Detmer, p. 31 
107 BN, p. 9 
108 BN, p. 9 
109 In the same passage, Sartre uses other terms, such as “disappear” and “decompose” to indicate the 
marginal attention given to these objects in the ground that is not arrested by the consciousness as they 
are not intentional objects of consciousness. 
110 BN, p. 9 (italics my own) 
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appearance of the principal figure.”111 Hence, it is clear from Being and Nothingness 
that the world cannot completely determine what I see. What I see (presence or 
absence of Pierre) is determined by the intentionality of my consciousness.  
Thirdly, ‘while Pierre’s absence cannot occur without a consciousness 
expecting or hoping to find his presence, this does not render his absence “purely 
subjective.”’112 Pierre is not absent because I expect him to be. The discovery that he is 
not around is an objective fact. Consciousness perceives its absence as Pierre’s absence 
“presents itself as a synthetic relation between Pierre and the setting in which I am 
looking for him.”113
Finally, the absence of Pierre is evidence for the fact that it is “the positive 
intuition of negativity that founds my ability to make negative judgement and not the 
other way round.”114  
 Therefore, the statement “consciousness is what it is not” refers to the 
nihilating activities of consciousness. This act is the disengagement from existing to 
the engagement of not existing. Examples of the nihilating activity of consciousness 
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2 Consciousness and Freedom 
 
 In the previous chapter, I attempted to explain the complexity of Sartre’s 
structure of consciousness that I identified as being vital to the understanding of the 
concept of freedom. The following sections will be a delineation of Sartre’s concept of 
freedom as derived from his discussion of the structure of consciousness.  
 
2.1 Freedom is Not What It is 
2.1.1 Existence Precedes Essence 
 
In rejecting Cartesian dualism, Sartre is essentially rejecting the distinction 
between an object and subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not a subject. There 
is no “I” doing the perceiving. To postulate consciousness as a subject will inevitably 
lead to discussions of the source of this subject. Sartre rejects the notion that human 
beings are endowed with a universal essence. Unlike Descartes, existence does not 
come about as a result of reflecting on “I” (I think therefore I am). The “I” is because it 
thinks. Thinking is, for Descartes, the essence of man and this act points man to the 
fact that he exists. Sartre rejects this. Existence comes first before the recognition of 
our consciousness or “I”. Man is free or condemned to be free because his existence is 
his essence, not an essence determined by sources other than himself. 
In defending existentialism in Existentialism and Human Emotion115 Sartre’s 
explanation of man’s freedom is predicated on his claim that “existence precedes 
essence.” Since he disagrees that man possesses an essence that is bestowed upon him 
by God, man alone is responsible for himself or his existence. This sense of freedom is 
                                                 
115 Sartre, Jean-Paul, (1957, 1985). Existentialism and Human Emotions in Marino, Gordon (2004), ed., 
Basic Writings of Existentialism. New York: The Modern Library, p. 341- 367. Subsequent reference to 
this book will be denoted as Marino, page number. 
 29
awakened by the anguish he feels. Anguish is a concept that goes with forlornness. 
Despair then is “reckoning only with what depends on our will, or on the ensemble of 
probabilities which makes our action [of freedom] possible.”116  
To say that man has an essence is also to say that “the individual man is the 
realization of a certain concept in the divine intelligence.”117 It is to say that Man 
possesses a universal concept, a concept of human reality that is present in all men as 
we are products of God. God made man using a defined method akin to the concept of 
a paper-cutter in the mind of the manufacturer. Like the paper-cutter, we are made 
“following a definition and a technique.”118
However, Sartre feels that his atheistic existentialism is more coherent. Instead 
of postulating a God who grants man an essence,119 man exists first and defines his 
essence later. Man is not definable as he is nothing. Like Sartre’s consciousness, man 
is “nothingness.”  He is “nothingness” here refers to the fact that man is not a thing,120 
a “human nature” created by God. “Man is nothing else but what he makes of 
himself.”121 It is a being-for-itself. This is also to say that to exist is to be free. Man 
does not first exist with a “human nature” to be free hereafter. To put it in the words of 
Sartre, “Il n’y a pas de difference entre l’être de l’homme et son être libre.”122 For 
Sartre, between the being, the existence of a man and his being free, there is no 
difference. 
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2.1.2 Freedom and External Objects 
 
 Man does not have an essence. He does not have an endowed or God-given 
essence that regulates his actions. His existence is synonymous with his freedom. He is 
condemned to be free. He alone is responsible for his actions. He cannot appeal to an 
innate nature or essence such as “[for] all man have sinned”123 to explain his actions. 
However, does that mean he is free to do anything he wants? How does he exercise his 
freedom? Does the external world of objects determine or affect his freedom? To use 
Sartre’s analogy, do the chains (external object) affect the freedom of the slave?  
 According to Sartre, as discussed in Chapter one, “the intended objects of 
consciousness are not constituted by and are independent of it.”124 Objects possess a 
certain stubborn obtrusiveness that cannot be altered at will. Given the obtrusiveness 
of the external objects of consciousness, how can man be free since he can do nothing 
to change the external world of objects? The answer lies in the transcendence of 
consciousness. “[T]ranscendence for Sartre refers to consciousness’s capacity to go 
beyond facticity to pursue what it desires”.125 “The facticity of freedom is the given 
which [human reality] has to be and which it illuminates by its project.”126 To put it in 
Sartrean terms, it refers to the being-in-itself that consciousness encounters. However, 
the fact that being bound is a facticity of the slave, the external object of consciousness 
is insufficient to determine what the slave might make out of its facticity. Steven 
Crowell states a similar point when explaining the relationship between facticity and 
its impact on human beings. He agrees that natural and social properties define what 
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human beings are, these “facticities” are not enough to determine what or who we 
really are. 
…the fact that natural and social properties can truly be 
predicated of human beings is not sufficient to determine what 
it is for me to be a human being. This, the existentialists argue, 
is because such properties are never merely brute 
determinations of who I am but are always in question. Who I 
am depends on what I make of my “properties”; they matter to 
me in a way that is impossible for merely available and 
occurrent entities.127
 
Objects in the external world are not only objects of consciousness, they are 
present as a background against which the freedom of man can be manifested. 
Freedom is the transcending of the objects of consciousness. Our freedom is seen in 
the “capacity to go beyond what is given (facticity) in order to desire, imagine or 
pursue a goal not given.”128 This act of transcending our facticity is what Sartre calls 
nihilation. This is the negating activity of consciousness. In the previous chapter, 
imagination, doubt, destruction, interrogation and perception are seen as examples and 
proofs of the negating activity of consciousness. These are also evidence of man’s 
freedom. 
 
2.2 Freedom is What It is Not 
 
 The statement “freedom is also what it is not” refers to the freedom that man 
has in the crucial act of being able perpetually to negate our present experiences. Now 
that Sartre has established the fact that “existence precedes essence”, where existence 
refers to consciousness’s act of nihilation, how does the act of nihilation have a bearing 
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on his concept of freedom? Also, how does this act parallel his discussion of 
consciousness?  
To reiterate, the defining characteristic of consciousness is the act of nihilation. 
Man does not possess an essence and is nothingness, as “nothingness” here refers to 
the nihilating capability of man. This is the freedom of man. Man is free as he 
continually makes, is making and remaking himself. It involves “a pure and simple 
negation of the given”129 in favour of what is not a given. In other words, it involves 
nihilating the “given” in order to realize what is not yet present.  
 The example that Sartre uses in Being and Nothingness to illustrate the 
negating activity of consciousness is that of waiting for a friend Pierre at a certain café 
at 4 o’clock. He writes that upon arrival, I investigate the environment for Pierre. 
Every single thing in the café - the patrons, waiters, tables and chairs, falls back into 
the background while I search for Pierre. My “ignoring” of each aspect of the 
environment in my search for Pierre constitutes an “original nihilation.” Then, I 
conclude that Pierre is not present but absent. “It is Pierre rising himself as nothingness 
on the ground of the nihilation of the café.”130 This is what Sartre terms the “double 
nihilation of the being”.131 The freedom of man, like consciousness is “a pure and 
simple negation of the given, and it exists (firstly) as the disengagement from a certain 
existing given and (secondly) as an engagement toward a certain not yet existing 
end.”132 Seen in this light, man can hold up his past and nihilate it. While in the present, 
he can project himself into a not yet realised but possible future.  
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However, it is important to note that these three temporal dimensions (past, 
present, future) are not discrete moments, but rather that they exhibit “ekstatic 
unity.”133 The unity of the act of nihilation is as follows: 
 
1) to not-be what it is,  
2) to be what it is not, and 
3) to be what it is not and to not-be what it is.134  
 
To understand what is implied in consciousness (1) “not being what it is”, it is 
vital that Sartre’s conception of the past is clarified here. It is common for many to 
think that since the past is no longer, it has no being and has no ontological relevance 
to the present or the future. Others, such as Bergson and Husserl, view the past still as 
a being but one that has retired and lost its efficacy.135 All these views are 
unacceptable to Sartre as they do not see the past as related to the present. For Sartre, 
seeing the past as related to the present is not an easy one either, as for him the past 
“has been conferred the existence of the in-itself, it is impossible to unite it to the 
present.” The in-itself is “isolated in its being and it does not enter into any connection 
with what is not itself.”136 The way Sartre explains the relation between the two 
temporal dimensions is to see them as a totality.137 “In doing so, one will see that the 
past is first of all my past. It is nothing, neither is it the present, but it is bound to a 
certain present and to a certain future, to both of which it belongs.”138 Seen as a totality, 
                                                 
133 Thepsophon, Phra, 1995. Sartre’s Existentialism and Early Buddhism [online]. Thailand: 
Mahachulalongkornrajvidyalaya University. Available from: http://www.mcu.ac.th/e-
book/English/manual/sartre/02.html [Accessed 17 January 2004]. 
134 ibid 
135 ibid 
136 BN, p. 28-29 
137 BN, p. 159 
138 Thepsophon, http://www.mcu.ac.th/e-book/English/manual/sartre/02.html 
 34
the past is the past of the present. The following is an explanation of the relation of the 
two temporal dimensions. The past and present are a totality. 
Man is not what he is in that he is not identical with what he was. I was an 
undergraduate student in the National University of Singapore in 1996, but not now. 
The negation of my identity as an undergraduate now does not mean that I was not an 
undergraduate student. The fact that I am not an undergraduate student now just means 
I have a past. “The past of a man is never cut off from his total being”139 and I am not 
dissociated from my past. The past has an ontological relation with the present. “It is 
originally the past of the present.”140 This relation is not an external one. Compare the 
relation of my being an undergraduate and an owner of a handphone.  The relation 
between me and my handphone is an external one and I can dissociate myself from 
it.141 I cease to become a handphone owner when I give up my handphone. However, 
my past forms the totality of my being and it is an internal relation that I cannot 
dissociate myself from. Again, this parallels what Sartre says about consciousness. 
 
What separates prior from subsequent is exactly nothing (rien). 
This nothing is absolutely impassable, just because it is 
nothing…The prior consciousness is always there (though 
with the modification of “pastness”). It constantly maintains a 
relation of interpretation with the present consciousness, but 
on the basis of this existential relation it is put out of the game, 
out of the circuit, between parentheses…142
 
The “prior conscious” does not exist in isolation but is always nihilated or surpassed 
continuously to add on to what is apprehended by consciousness at every intentional 
moment.  
The present consciousness is referred to as a “is what it is not”. In contrast to 
the past that has become a finite, impermeable being in-itself, the present 
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consciousness is the for-itself.143 It is for-itself as consciousness and it exists as 
reflection reflecting; it is “a witness of itself as not being that thing.”144 It is aware of 
itself as not (or nihilating the fact) being that object that it is reflecting on. Sartre 
explains consciousness in the present as: 
 
…the internal negation of- The structure at the basis of 
intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the 
internal relation of the for-itself to the thing…it is in the mode 
of the for-itself; that is, as a separate existence in as much as it 
reveals itself as not being.145
 
From the above passage in Being and Nothingness, the “what it is not” of the 
present consciousness refers to the perpetual flight from the being-in-itself.  It is a non-
being (always in a state of “is not”), a nothingness that is antithetical to the finitude 
and permanence of the being-in-itself. Furthermore, “[t]he present can never be 
grasped in the form of an instant, for the instant is the moment when the present is. But 
the present never is; it has no being which coincides with itself.”146
The present consciousness that is referred to as a “is what it is not” refers to a 
future that man can be but not realised yet. For Sartre, “the future is what I have to be 
in so far as I cannot be it.”147 The present is always a perpetual flight from the past into 
the future. However, the point of departure for man being “not what it is” (past) and 
“what it is not” (present) is that all possibility is ruled out in man nihilating his past 
into the present. The future is regarded as a project of possibility as it presents us “with 
a fragility of that which could be and could also not be”.148 “The future is what I would 
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be if I were not free and what I can have to be only because I am free.”149 It is not a 
future that is determined by a universal human nature but a continual nihilation of the 
present and projection into a possibility. Here we see an “internal relation”150 between 
the past and future with present consciousness. Present consciousness is the reference 
point relative to which there is a past and a future.151  
 
Before itself, behind itself; never itself is the description of the 
present. Before itself, it has to be its future; and behind itself, 
it has to be its past. At present it is not what it is (past) and it is 
what it is not (future).152
  
Therefore, “to be what it is not and to not-be what it is” is the internal structure 
of consciousness (act of nihilation). Consciousness can exist simultaneously in the 
threefold ekstastic unity of past, present and future because consciousness (for-itself) is 
nothingness. It does not exist first to nihilate this or that. It exists first as nothingness 
as it is a perpetual flight from the past and projects itself into the future to unite itself 
with nothingness, “with that which, if added to its present, would make it be what it 
is”.153 “Present, Past and Future – all at the same time the for-itself dispersing its being 
in three dimensions is temporal due to the very fact that it nihilates itself.”154
 Hence, existence is nothingness. Man is not a thing, a human nature created by 
God. Also, “nothingness” refers to the liberating nihilating capability of man. Freedom 
is nihilation and this “nothingness” constitutes existence. This is what Sartre means 
when he says that “existence precedes essence.” To exist is to be free. He does not 
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exist first and then become free. “It is freedom which is the foundation of all 
essences.”155
 Finally, to sum up the exposition of Sartre’s concept of freedom, it is also 
necessary to know that one could stay in the pre-reflective stage and be immersed in 
the being-in-itself. Such an individual has chosen to be in bad faith.156 Consciousness 
works in such a way that to become aware of itself as a reflecting consciousness, it 
must awaken from its pre-reflective stage. This awakening also signals man’s 
awareness of the freedom that he is condemned to. The following emotions 




 The awareness of this freedom, that man is forever an ekstatic unity of past 
present and future, constitutes anguish. This is not to say that anguish is a proof157 of 
our freedom. Freedom is known by our experience of it. In other words, we find the 
experience of freedom in the phenomenon of anguish. 
 
There should exist for man, in so far as he is conscious of 
existing, a certain way of maintaining himself in the face of 
his past and his future, as being one with his past and future, 
and as being distinct from them. Now it is in anguish that man 
attains consciousness of his liberty, or, if you will, anguish is 
the mode of being of liberty as consciousness of being free.158
 
The experience that man is a perpetual surpassing of the given is a continuous, active 
and never-ending responsibility shouldered only by himself. In fact, Sartre calls it a 
condemnation. “... [M]an is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not 
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create himself, yet in other respects is free; because once thrown into the world he is 
responsible for everything he does.”159 As discussed earlier, nothing (not an essence or 
God-given nature) can serve as an excuse to discard such responsibility. The emotion 
of anguish, though empowering (as we are aware of our freedom) creates a heavy 
sense of apprehension.160 Hayin describes anguish as an attitude that involves both 
“apprehension and exhilaration.”161 It is exhilarating since our destinies are in our own 
hands. Anguish is anguish before myself. The choices I make are not imposed from the 
outside or conditioned by determinants of the in-itself.162 Sartre’s example of the man 
that stands in front of the precipice demonstrates this. 
Vertigo is anguish to the extent that I am afraid not of falling 
over the precipice, but of throwing myself over (italics my 
own).163
 
To have a clearer understanding of anguish, I’ll contrast anguish with fear. 
“Fear is fear of the things of the world, but anguish is anguish ‘devant moi’.” Fear is 
the unreflecting apprehension of a transcendent object, while anguish is the reflective 
apprehension of self.”164 Fear is spontaneous, immediate while anguish is reflective. 
When one is fearful, the attention is directed at the object that exists outside 
consciousness. When one is in anguish, consciousness becomes aware of his being as 
for-itself. Fear is motivated by a transcendental object (a situation) that exists outside 
consciousness so the feeling is evoked as a result of the possibility of being changed 
from without.165 Anguish, being the feeling evoked by the reflective consciousness is 
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provoked to the extent that I distrust myself and my own reactions to that situation,166 
and in this case, it refers to the apprehension of our freedom, our nothingness. Fear is, 
to put it in Sartrean terms, an inauthentic state while anguish is authentic. Fear is an 
inauthentic state as it refers to, as it were, a tendency to do what others do and 
behaving myself in ways one is expected to, behaviours that are typical and public. 
“Authenticity – in German, Eigentlichkeit – names that attitude in which I engage in 
projects as my own (eigen).”167 Anguish, unlike fear, refers to a kind of transparency in 
acknowledging the emotions I am experiencing. Anguish operates with the knowledge 
“that decisive behaviour which determines my future projects must emanate from a 
Self which I have not yet become.”168 It is not an unreflective “spontaneous” response 
to a situation but an awareness of my response to either respond like others in fear, or 
to agonise over possibilities that I can commit to. Sartre’s example of a man who loses 
his wealth, in Being and Nothingness, illustrates the difference between fear and 
anguish. 
 
The man who has just received a hard blow – for example, 
losing a great part of his wealth in a crash- can have the fear of 
threatening poverty. He will experience anguish a moment 
later when nervously wringing his hands…, he exclaims to 
himself: “What am I going to do? But where am I going to 
go?”169
 
In fear, the man would complacently drift along with the mood (fear) that accompanies 
the situation acting on man. Anguish, on the other hand, is the experience of my 
possibility of acting on the situation. I could agonise over my possibility of fighting the 
situation by working very hard to earn the wealth I have lost, eking out a living 
through humble means, stealing or even staying fearful. I am in agony as it is a 
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“dispossessing” retreat into myself and “seeing through” the complacent option of 
living out my facticity or “essence”, and this is to stay poor and fearful.170 “Anguish is 
the recognition of a possibility as my possibility; it is constituted when consciousness 
sees itself divided from its essence by nothingness or separated from the future by its 
liberty.”171  
 The phenomenon of anguish supports my analysis in this section that freedom 
is what it is not. I am free (as experienced in the mood of anguish) because 
consciousness is (1) not what it is. Through anguish, we experience the freedom to act 
or not to act in accordance with our present situation of poverty. I can be (2) what I am 
not. My freedom is constituted by distancing myself from expected behaviours in the 
situation of poverty (facticity) and projecting into a future possibility (fighting poverty, 
stealing etc.) I have yet to realise.  In anguish, I experience the freedom to be “not-




 “Forlornness and anguish go together.”172 Hence, it is necessary that we 
understand this term used by Sartre more thoroughly so as to have a better grasp of 
anguish. In The Devil and the Good Lord, Goetz says: 
There was no one but myself; I alone decided on Evil; and I 
alone invented Good. It was I who cheated, I who worked 
miracles, I who accused myself today, I alone who can absolve 
myself; I, man. If God exists, man is nothing; if man 
exists…God doesn’t exist.173
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Sharing the same term as Heidegger, forlornness for Sartre means that “God does not 
exist and that we have to face all the consequences of this.”174 If God does not exist, 
we cannot explain things or events with reference to an a priori Good or a universal 
fixed human nature. A more significant consequence of forlornness is that man cannot 
turn to universal values or commands to legitimize or justify his/her conduct. In short, 
“we are alone, with no excuses.”175
 It is in this sense that man is condemned to be free. Existence precedes essence. 
Existence is nothingness; the continual act of nihilating the objects of consciousness. 
This is man’s very being or, to put it in Sartrean terms, a being that is free to choose 
and to not choose. Man is not going to find “in the world some omen by which to 
orient himself.”176 Man will orient the omen to suit himself. He is, continuously  
inventing himself; forging a future and a “virgin future”177 at every moment. 
He is condemned to be free as he is responsible for everything he does. We cannot 
attribute our actions to any sweeping passion that engulfs us and propels us helplessly 
to certain acts and is therefore an excuse for our action.178 Sartre thinks that man is 
responsible for his passion. “[M]an is utterly and completely free, he is not determined 
even in the moment of violent passion; human liberty is universal.”179  
 Hence, man is in anguish when he attains consciousness of his freedom. He is 
nothingness and in full control of his decisions. He is solely responsible for his 
decisions, the meaning he gives to things. Sartre writes: 
Therefore everything takes place as if I were compelled to be 
responsible. I am abandoned in the world…in the sense that I 
find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in an 
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act which I bear the whole responsibility without being able, 
whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for 
an instant.180
 
He is in anguish because of forlornness. God does not exist and like Mathieu, Sartre’s 
Everyman, we “could do what [we] liked, no one had the right to advise [us], there 
would be for him no Good nor Evil unless [we] brought them into being… [We 
were]…free and alone, without assistance and without excuse, condemned to decide 




 The experience of anguish and forlornness demonstrates the power as well as 
sense of isolation a free being encounters in Being and Nothingness. We are absolutely 
free to choose anything we desire but this choice is a condemnation as it is a defining 
characteristic of existence. It does not cease. Nobody can influence or put a stop to this 
condition of our existence, and certainly not a divine being that traditionalists have 
purported to account for the inherent behaviours or nature that we are endowed with. 
We are solely responsible for all our actions. The experience of despair as discussed by 
Sartre, points us to the same existential conclusion. We are solely responsible for our 
actions. This is true even in cases where the will or decision of others are imposed on 
us. We can also impose our will on others but this does not make a third party 
responsible for our actions. The experience of despair makes us aware that we cannot 
control (and vice versa) the actions of others.  
  In Existentialism and Human Emotions, despair means that “we shall confine 
ourselves to reckoning only with what depends upon our will, or on the ensemble of 
                                                 
180 BN, p. 673 
181 BN, p. 116 
 43
probabilities which makes our action possible.”182 According to Marino, the point that 
Sartre is making here is that even though we are “condemned to be free”, the choice 
will be made only among the possibilities that are presented to us. Possibilities that are 
“not rigorously involved in [our] own action”183 should not be considered.  The 
example that Sartre gives in Existentialism and Human Emotion is the fight for the 
propagation of Marxism. As far as “X” is working hand in hand and are “involved” 
with fellow fighters, the realisation of their Marxist dream remains a possibility for 
“X”. The action of “X” comports with the ensemble of possibilities. However, could 
“X” still choose the possibility of propagating Marxism if he were to be handicapped? 
Sartre’s answer would be “yes” but the possibilities that are available to “X” should 
not include getting someone to fulfil the dream for him. This is so as even though “X” 
could choose to get a fellow comrade to fulfil his dream, the experience of despair tells 
us that others are free and independent. There is no absolute certainty of human 
commitment that one could depend on. The actions of others are beyond our control. 
With others, there are only probabilities, never certainty. We must concern ourselves 
with our own possibilities. Our freedom should be exercised in the context of what we 
know, not possibilities of others that are not within our control.  
 Since I cannot control the possibilities of others, should I then let others do 
what I cannot? This attitude is quietism,184 and Sartre repudiates it for it goes against 
the freedom that he purports. Freedom is active, not passive. Knowing that we are 
working within our own possibilities does not limit our freedom. Freedom is the 
recognition that we cannot ascribe our failures to possibilities that “could have” or 
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184 Quietism in Existentialism and Human Emotion is defined as the attitude of people who say, “Let 
others do what I can’t do”. The definition provided in The Collaborative International Dictionary of 
English (v.0.48) found on the website http://www.wordiq.com/dictionary/quietism.html could further 
explain quietism. Quietism could also mean “peace or tranquillity of mind; calmness; indifference; 
apathy; dispassion; indisturbance; inaction.” 
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“should have” been present. For example, one can’t say that I could have been one of 
the firemen who heroically dashed into the World Trade Centre on September 11 to 
rescue the victims if not for the fact that I had a cowardly constitution. We are what we 
choose to do. For example, I am a coward because I chose to dodge from dangerous 
situations, not because of an uncontrollable genetic defect that attributes cowardice to 
our personality. Confronting the dangerous situation was a possibility that I did not 
choose, it is not that it was beyond the sphere of possibility made available to me.  
Despair for Sartre is that “man is nothing else than his plan, he exists only to 
the extent that he fulfils himself, he is therefore nothing else than the ensemble of his 
acts, nothing else than his life.”185 Despair here reiterates the consistent point that 
Sartre has been making in his exposition of freedom. Man alone is responsible for his 
choices and action. There is no appeal to a universal or divinely endowed nature to 
justify our actions. Similarly, in the case of despair, we certainly cannot depend on 
others to fulfil the project that I have chosen. We are solely responsible for actualising 
our choice of projects. In many situations, we inevitably need the involvement of 
others but we do not depend on them to fulfil our plans. The parameters of possibilities 
are ours and we must concern ourselves with our own possibilities. One cannot, as it 
were (in good faith), sit at home and let others do what I cannot. “Man is nothing else 
than his plan.”186
The experience of despair shows one the possibilities that are involved in our 
own action, our plan. Recognising our possibilities does not allow us to attribute our 
failure to possibilities outside our control. In Existentialism and Human Emotion, 
Sartre explains that if one does not have the experience of great love, it cannot be the 
case that he/she has not met a man or woman who was worthy, or to put the blame on 
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the very small social circle he or she is in. There is no love other than that that is 
manifested in the one who is in love. One should not make reference to possibilities 
outside the involvement of being in love. We are not in love because we have chosen 
not to fall in love with someone, not because of other possible reasons that are beyond 
our control. Freedom here is total involvement in a particular plan of action. This 
particular plan of action then would be like the Fundamental Project that helps us focus 
on our possibilities, and not possibilities outside that.  
 
2.3  Freedom, Autonomy and Responsibility 
 
From the discussion in this chapter, freedom is “to be what it is not and to not-
be what it is” through the nihilating activity of consciousness. The internal structure of 
consciousness is such that it is always a perpetual flight from the past, a negating of 
the present and a continual projection into the future to unite itself with nothingness. A 
free action is not dissociated from its past. A present choice made from the 
possibilities presented. The possibility we work towards is determined by the project 
or end that we have chosen. In this sense, freedom, like consciousness, is “to be what it 
is not and to not-be what it is.” The phrase entails making use of a past that I cannot be 
disassociated from (i.e. I was a chain smoker). The past is continually surpassed; “its 
being is no longer for-itself since it no longer exists as reflection-reflecting.”187 The 
past, in this sense has “solidified”. It has turned from a “for-itself” to an “in-itself in 
which all possibility is excluded.”188 However, it is important to note here that the 
surpassing of the past is a continuous one. The smoker might have been successful in 
rejecting the temptation to smoke today but this does not in any way guarantee that he 
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has permanently surpassed his addiction. The experience of the past (as a smoker) is 
made use of in the act of nihilation. The transcending of the past is continuous and 
moves the smoker towards the Fundamental Project of quitting smoking.  
Hence, the past is a necessary structure for the continual projection of 
possibility for the future.189 The past in this sense becomes the essence for the present 
and future possibility and that is why Sartre says “[our] essence is in the past.”190
Going back to the same example, nihilating the past (a smoking addict) is necessary for 
my working towards dropping my addiction to smoking (to not-be what it is); an end 
that I have yet to achieve.191 The future remains a possibility, a “not-being what it is” 
as the future is always a possibility rather than determined. I am free to decide whether 
I can eventually kick the habit of smoking. It is also important to note here that 
Sartre’s theory of freedom forms the foundation for his moral theory. Man is to be held 
responsible for all his actions. The smoker is solely responsible for his choice. His 
freedom and accompanying responsibility is absolute and extended to every possible 
situation he is presented with. 
This essentially is what chapter four of Being and Nothingness is about. 
Sartre’s construction of his consciousness leading to the discussion of freedom is done 
with the primary aim of showing that man alone is responsible for all the choices that 
he makes. He is in anguish, despair and experiences forlornness as he is awakened to 
this ultimate reality of his existence. He is alone and must decide at every moment how 
he makes himself. Nothing can be used as an excuse for doing or not doing something. 
He is completely and forever free. This is the freedom and autonomy he is condemned 
to. 
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not delved deeper into the present for-itself as the focus of the discussion here is to describe a free act. 
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  The obvious conclusion to the foregone section would immediately raise 
questions of whether man can really be completely free. Is his freedom absolute in that 
nothing about his facticity can limit his freedom? Paradoxically, Sartre proclaims 
unswervingly that man is absolutely free but states at the same time that freedom is 
limited or must be posited against a background of facticity. In fact, it is against the co-
efficiency of adversity that freedom can exist. Can Sartre consistently hold that man is 
free and not free at the same time? In brief, this is the Inconsistency Objection. This 
objection will be explained further in the next chapter. However, it is important to note 
here that the reason for using the Inconsistent Objection is not because it is the 
strongest criticism of Sartre’s Theory of Freedom. Merleau-Ponty, one of Sartre’s most 
outstanding critics, would warrant a more thorough discussion if my objective were to 
point out the weakness in Sartre’s phenomenological treatise on freedom. The 
Inconsistency Objection brings to surface many severe misreading or careless 
interpretations of what Sartre is saying about freedom in Being and Nothingness. 
These misconceptions will become the vital building blocks in my discussion of what I 











3 Ontological and Practical Freedom  
  
The example of the slave is one good expression of the Sartrean conception of 
freedom. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre declares that “[t]he slave in chains is as free 
as his master.”192
According to the Inconsistency Objection, one could immediately spot two 
counter-intuitive strands in his argument. The slave is both free and not free at the 
same time. How can one who is physically bound (not free) be considered free? 
According to critics who use this objection against Sartre, much of the controversy and 
confusion is a result of Sartre not “being sufficiently careful in his use of the term 
freedom.”193  
In this chapter, the Inconsistency Objection and the apparent “weakness” of 
Sartre’s theory of freedom (that Sartre was not sufficiently careful in his use of the 
word “freedom”) will be explained. The main objective of this chapter is not to defend 
Sartre and attack the Inconsistency Objection, for that would be to attack a straw man. 
The Inconsistency Objection is fraud with problems and this is the result of 
compartmentalizing Sartre’s ideas in Being and Nothingness. Specifically, the 
Inconsistency Objection is a compartmentalized analysis and criticism of Sartre’s 
ontological and practical freedom. 
Hence, in this chapter I will, in rejecting the compartmentalized analysis of the 
two types of freedom, establish the argument that ontological and practical freedom in 
Being and Nothingness are not separate terms that can be understood in isolation. 
Contrary to what is assumed in the Inconsistency Objection, the definitions of the two 
                                                 
192 BN, p. 550 
193 Whitford, Margaret, 1982. Merleau Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy. Lexington, Kentucky: 
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types of freedom are intertwined as the relation between ontological freedom and 
practical freedom is one of interdependence. This relationship of interdependence is 
illustrated clearly by Sartre in the context of Being and Nothingness. The 
understanding of this relationship requires a rejection of any accusation of 
inconsistency for that suggests placing two terms that are antithetical together.  
In this chapter, the compartmentalized analysis of the two types of freedom is 
seen firstly in how the proponents of the Inconsistency Objection argues that in the 
statement “freedom is absolute and limited” is inconsistent, Sartre is assumed to have 
attributed two different traits to one generalized concept of freedom.194 This is not an 
accurate reading of Sartre as he is using the two traits to describe two types of freedom 
– ontological and practical freedom. The two types of freedom will be discussed in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3. Secondly, too much attention is paid to the conjunction “and” in 
the statement above. The statement by Sartre is rejected by the proponents of the 
Inconsistency Objection on the grounds that two different traits cannot be used to 
describe a term. This is especially so when the word “absolute” is seen to contradict 
“limited”. Again, this is not the case in Being and Nothingness. The inconsistency 
criticism is constructed out of examining one concept without considering the context 
in which the concept is used. For example, when ontological freedom is described as 
absolute, many take Sartre to be equating absolute ontological freedom with 
omnipotence. In the context of Sartre’s discussion, “absolute” freedom actually refers 
to a condition of existence. Hence, with careful understanding of the context in which 
“absolute” and “limited” are used in Being and Nothingness, it would be clear that 
Sartre is not being inconsistent when he uses “absolute” and “limited” not just on one 
sense of freedom. The two words are both used, in Sartre’s unique way to describe 
                                                 
194 Many critics thought Sartre was merely using “freedom” in the ordinary sense of the word. Although 
the word “freedom” was used interchangeably with other terms like “liberty” and “choice”, he was 
referring to two types of freedom. 
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both ontological and practical freedom. I think that Sartre’s exposition of freedom in 
Being and Nothingness should be correctly interpreted as “freedom (ontological and 
practical) is (both) (ontologically) and limited (practically).”195  The complicated use 
of Sartre’s terminology will be examined in section 3.4 in this chapter. 
Though problematic, the Inconsistency Objection is useful to me in identifying 
the two key reasons for the misreading of Sartre. All these misreading or 
compartmentalized understanding of Sartre’s theory of freedom will be addressed in 
this chapter. These misconceptions of Sartre’s ideas are vital platforms on which I will 
build my discussion of the key features of Sartre’s two types of freedom and use of 
certain terms in Being and Nothingness.  
 
3.1 The Inconsistency Objection 
 
 Sartre has been accused of being inconsistent in his statements about freedom. 
In Being and Nothingness, freedom is both unlimited and limited. Sartre’s hyperbolic 
proclamations in Being and Nothingness seem to point to rather ludicrous conclusions 
for his theory of freedom.  On one hand, Sartre claims that the slave in chains is as free 
as his master. This suggests absolute freedom and complete control of one’s situation 
regardless of the obstacles we face in achieving freedom. On the other hand, Sartre 
asserts that “freedom can exist only as restricted.”196 Ordinary encounters we 
experience would give us ample ground to reject these two counter-intuitive strands in 
Sartre’s theory of freedom. In fact, a hostile reaction reads, “[s]urely all of this 
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constitutes the sort of deep nonsense which all sober minds feel compelled to 
reject.”197
The Inconsistency Objection would have been a successful objection against 
Sartre if these two antithetical strands in his theory of freedom were mutually 
inconsistent statements about the same thing. However, as I shall in the following 
sections explain, the two statements are mutually consistent statements about different 
things.198 The two different “things” here are ontological freedom and practical 
freedom. 
 
3.2 Ontological Freedom 
3.2.1 Intention 
 
Many critics of Sartre agree that Sartre refers to more than one sense of 
freedom in his philosophical discussion of this phenomenological concept. Detmer, in 
particular, summarizes the different senses of freedom used by Sartre in the following: 
 
Sartre does in fact distinguish between different senses of 
freedom… While Sartre seldom calls a great deal of attention 
to it, and while many of his critics evidently have not noticed 
it, Sartre does repeatedly and explicitly draw distinction 
between different senses of “freedom.” Thus we find that he 
distinguishes between “freedom” and “power”, between 
“freedom of choice” and “freedom of obtaining”, between the 
freedom we are and the freedom we can become; between 
“metaphysical,” “artistic,” and “political and social” freedom; 
between “metaphysical freedom” and “practical freedom”, 
between “abstract freedom” and “concrete freedom”, between 
“political and intellectual freedom” and “economic and social 
freedom”…199
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It is an indisputable fact that the concept of freedom is a preoccupation of Sartre in 
many of his writings. While Sartre refers to many senses of “freedom”, the most 
paradoxical statement of freedom that has been identified by the proponents of the 
Inconsistency Objection is his claim, in Being and Nothingness, that man is absolutely 
free but at the same time, this freedom is also limited.  
 It is clear that Sartre uses two distinct senses of freedom. He terms them 
“freedom of choice” and “freedom of obtaining” in Being and Nothingness. They will 
be referred to as ontological freedom (“freedom of choice”) and practical freedom 
(“freedom of obtaining”) in my discussion.200 According to Detmer, these two different 
statements about freedom are actually mutually consistent. 
Ontological freedom and practical freedom can be defined with recourse to 
Sartre’s pour soi/ en soi model. The ontological basis of the first sense of freedom is 
derived from the idea that free choice and consciousness (pour soi) are one and the 
same thing. The ontological freedom that Sartre is talking about is the freedom of 
consciousness. It is important to note that freedom is not understood in the ordinary 
sense of the word. It does not refer to political or social freedom that means that we are 
free from poverty and hence enjoy the freedom of, for example, consumerism. For 
Sartre, ontological freedom is a “quality” of action or the “condition of freedom.”201 It 
is a metaphysical necessity. It is not an empirical observation where being a free 
person implies being free from a constraint. Ontological freedom does not admit 
contingencies or possibilities other than those that signal its absolute freedom. 
Metaphysically, Sartre’s consciousness is freedom. Like the structure of consciousness 
(always action) that is a perpetual flight towards the Fundamental Project, ontological 
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book, she refers to the two terms as ontological freedom and freedom in a situation.  
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freedom is always a freedom to. Hence, ontological freedom is always a freedom to but 
never a freedom from (which entails one being trapped and the possibility of being 
freed afterwards).  
Margaret Whitford summarises this same point in the following: 
 
The first sense is what we might be called ontological freedom, 
the sense in which freedom, like consciousness, is the defining 
characteristic of human beings. To be is to be free. In this 
sense, freedom and consciousness are one and the same. This 
is what Sartre means when he writes that “nous sommes 
condamnés à la liberté.”202   
 
 
To explain Whitford’s point further, it is necessary to return to the idea that 
Sartre’s consciousness is intentional. To be conscious is to be conscious of something 
and the “intended objects of consciousness are not constituted by and are independent 
of it.”203  The apprehension of the objects of consciousness is not dependent on its 
situation (en soi) that is permanent, impermeable and passive. Instead, his 
apprehension of the objects happens via the nihilating behaviours of consciousness. 
Consciousness “singles out” what it intends, and negates everything else that it does 
not intend. Consciousness can separate itself from all that is external to it. To put it in 
another way, nothing in its situation can determine what consciousness will focus on. 
Searching for Pierre in the café could again be suitably adduced as an example to 
illustrate this point. In the protagonist’s (consciousness) search for Pierre, the situation 
(café) melts into the undifferentiated background, as it is not an object intended by 
consciousness. It is in this sense that freedom (of consciousness) is absolute, for it 
cannot be in any way determined by what is external to consciousness. Man is free to 
choose what he wants from the background, or being-itself, based on the intention or 
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Fundamental Project chosen. In this case, the Fundamental Project is to find Pierre in 




Furthermore, to say that man is absolutely free is also to say that his choice is 
not in any way undermined by causal factors. The freedom of consciousness is 
absolute; a for-itself. The activity of consciousness is not subject to strict causality. 
Strict causality here refers firstly to the Sartrean idea that one could not appeal to an 
endowed universal “essence” to account for the activity of consciousness. 
Consciousness is free as it is nothingness (without an essence), and its activity is not 
caused or influenced by an “essence” it is endowed with. For example, it cannot be the 
case that a particular disposition or inherent genetic composition of mine has caused 
me to perceive the café in a particular way.   
Secondly, consciousness is not subject to strict causality as there is no causal 
link between en soi and pour soi. While we cannot appeal to a divine being that 
endows us with an essence that “causes” us to behave in one way or another, Sartre 
would also reject the notion that something in the external environment has the 
“power” to effect a change in the decisions we make and the behaviours we choose. 
Nothing in the external environment has the power to make me perceive things in a 
particular way. With reference to the example of locating Pierre in the café, nothing in 
the café causes me to notice that Pierre is not around. I noticed that he is not around as 
consciousness is posited to find Pierre. Pierre’s absence is “revealed” or his presence is 
seen as a “lack” as consciousness intends to find him.  
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Thus, ontological freedom cannot be defined in terms of cause and effect and 
this squares perfectly with Sartre’s repudiation of determinism and “all forms of 
thought which evade responsibility in essentialism.”204 Detmer makes the same point 
succinctly in the following. 
 
I am absolutely free because no situation can completely 
determine how I will interpret that situation, what project I 
will form with respect to that interpretation, or how I will act 
in attempting to carry out that project. To be sure, there are 
any number of external forces which “push” me in various 
directions; but these forces cannot by themselves, without my 
complicity determine my action. The connection between 
freedom and negativity is nowhere more clearly illustrated 
than in the simple fact that, with respect to any external force, 
insofar as I am conscious of it, I can always say “no” to it, and 
choose to undertake the project of acting in opposition to it.205  
 
 
It is with this definition of ontological freedom that Sartre makes the apparently 
preposterous proclamation that “the slave in chains is as free as his master.”206 Though 
subjugated, the slave is ontologically free to interpret the situation or environment he is 
in. He could continue to conceive a plan to escape and risk his life or choose to be 
resigned to his fate. Contentment is indeed blissful and liberating for the slave. 
Nothing in his environment can influence his freedom to interpret the situation he is in. 
Another illustration of the absolute freedom (ontologically) can be seen in the freedom 
exhibited by the unemployed in Sartre’s article, “A more Precise Characterization of 
Existentialism.” Despite his financial destitution, the unemployed man is free as “he 
can always choose to accept his lot with resignation or to rebel against it.”207 Both 
protagonists are absolutely free (ontologically). 
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 There is a dangerous and invalid reading of Sartre. Some critics, such as 
Marcuse, have objected to Sartre’s absolute freedom as to them, the obvious 
implication here is that ontological freedom is an internal freedom208 that is ineffectual, 
or at best a nice ideology one could hold on to in order to explain situations where we 
see “brute reality of unfreedom”. 
 
The treatise on human freedom has here reached the point of 
self-abdication. The persecution of the Jews, and “les tenailles 
du bourreau” are the terror which is the world today, they are 
the brute reality of unfreedom. To the existentialist 
philosopher, however, they appear as examples of the 
existence of human freedom. The fact that Sartre’s 
demonstration is ontologically correct and a time-honoured 
and successful feature of idealism only proves the remoteness 
of this demonstration from the “réalité humaine”. If 
philosophy, by virtue of its existential-ontological concepts of 
man or freedom, is capable of demonstrating that the 
persecuted Jew and the victim of the executioner are and 
remain absolutely free and masters of a self-responsible choice, 
then these philosophical concepts have declined to the level of 
a mere ideology, an ideology which offers itself as a most 
handy justification for the persecutors and executioners – 
themselves an important part of the “réalité humaine”.209
 
 This is arguably an invalid reading of Sartre where Sartre has been thought to argue 
that we could think or imagine anything we want in our minds. Having these thoughts 
alone is what he considers to be absolute ontological freedom.210 If this were the case, 
then Sartre would be purporting phenomenological solipsism rather than a treatise on 
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According to Detmer, success is not important when applied to Sartre’s concept 
of ontological freedom.211 When we say that the slave is absolutely free (ontologically), 
it is not necessary that there is a corresponding freedom that he could exercise 
physically (or practically). This is precisely Sartre’s point. He is clearly rejecting the 
common notion of success. 
 
In addition, it is necessary to point out to “common sense” 
that the formula “to be free” does not mean “to obtain what 
one has wished” but rather “by oneself to determine oneself to 
wish” (in the broad sense of choosing). In other words, 
success is not important to freedom. The discussion which 
opposes common sense to philosophers stems here from a 
misunderstanding: the empirical and popular concept of 
“freedom” which has been produced by historical, political, 
and moral circumstances is equivalent to “the ability to obtain 
the ends chosen”.212
 
“Success” here refers to the slave being physically freed from slavery but this is 
not necessary to Sartre’s concept of ontological freedom. According to the common 
understanding of success, to be a “successfully” free person, ontological freedom 
exhibited by the slave in chains must be accompanied by a simultaneous freedom that 
could be exhibited practically, i.e., the slave needs to be physically freed; the 
unemployed, free from poverty. For Sartre, the physical demonstration of freedom is 
important but it does not mean that every physical occurrence of freedom must be a 
“successful” one. 
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further elaborated in my discussion of practical freedom. 
212 BN, p. 483 
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This reading of Sartre’s ontological freedom has been criticised. As explained 
in the previous section, if freedom is understood only in the empirical sense of the 
word, some could claim that, divorced from a successful situational manifestation of 
freedom, ontological freedom seems to be only like an “internal freedom” that can be 
asserted without consideration of the situation. The slave is a free man even though he 
is in chains.  
Another invalid logical implication of the criticism is surfaced here. According 
to the Inconsistency Objection, it is inconsistent to claim that man is absolutely free 
and “unfree” (limited) at the same time. Here, we see an invalid reading of Sartre. 
What is implied in the Inconsistency Objection here is that they see absolute freedom 
as the opposite of limited freedom. They see absolute freedom as the absence of 
limited freedom and limited freedom as the negation of absolute freedom. To put it in 
other words, how can one be free unless he can be bound in the first place? To these 
critics, freedom is always a freedom from. Being absolutely free and seeing this 
freedom as limited at the same time is logically untenable. If freedom is always a 
freedom from, we can only be free if we can be trapped in the first place. However, 
Sartre’s ontological freedom is always a freedom to. 
 
3.3 Practical Freedom  
 
What then is practical freedom? Going back to Sartre’s model of en soi and 
pour soi, objects that are external to consciousness are Sartre’s being-in- itself that is 
“characterised by impermeability and infinite density. It is so full of itself that it does 
not admit of any change or becoming…The in-itself is also untreated, not subject to 
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temporality, and undifferentiated.”213 However, the being-in-itself serves as a “ground” 
for the nihilating activities of consciousness. This is not to say that being-for-itself and 
being-in-itself are mutually dependent. Being-in-itself is wholly independent. “It is 
thus absolutely non-referential. Lacking differentiating predicates, it can only be said 
to be.”214 The relationship between Sartre’s en soi and pour soi is aptly summarised by 
Thepsophon in the following. 
Consciousness, as the nihilation of a particular being, has only 
“a borrowed existence”. “For consciousness there is no being 
except for this precise obligation to be revealing intuition of 
something.” Without the in-itself to be revealed, consciousness 
cannot be self-conscious and thereby ceases to exist as “pure 
appearance.” From this, it follows that the in-itself is 
ontologically prior to consciousness and establishes the ground 
for it. Consciousness without the in-itself is a kind of 
abstraction; it could not exist any more than a colour could 
exist without form. This does not imply that consciousness and 
the in-itself are mutually dependent. The in-itself has no need 
of consciousness in order to be. The phenomenon of the in-
itself is an abstraction without consciousness but its being is 
not an abstraction.215              
         
Just as being-in-itself serves as a situation for the nihilating activity of consciousness 
(being-for-itself), the situation is the ground on which freedom could be observed or 
achieved.216 Whitford makes the same point. “But consciousness can only exist in a 
situation, so freedom must also be identified with reference to the situation.”217 When 
one is practically free, he/she could be said to be engaged in free acts. Going back to 
the example of the prisoner, he is practically free when he is no longer chained. Since 
he is chained, he is practically unfree. His freedom has been limited. This does not 
mean the prisoner is not free.  
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The slave does not have to be free from the chains that bind him before he can be practically free. 
217 Whitford, p. 58 
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To be practically unfree is the same as saying that there are limits to freedom. 
What does Sartre mean when he says that there are limits to freedom but man is at the 
same time absolutely free? This Inconsistency Objection is arguably misguided and 
stems from a lack of understanding of Sartre’s use of “freedom in a situation” or 
“practical freedom”. When we refer to freedom in a situation, the immediate response 
is to reject this notion of freedom, as freedom seems to be nullified when it has to be 
confined to a situation. Sartre’s idea that there can only be freedom in a situation 
seems like a contradiction in terms. To put it in another way, man can never be 
“practically free” but only “practically unfree” as freedom is always confined to a 
situation.  
To defend Sartre, one needs firstly to clarify what is meant by “freedom in a 
situation” or “practical freedom”. What does Sartre mean when he says that freedom 
must exist in a context or against a background? Does the context limit our freedom? If 
freedom in a situation is truly limiting, Sartre would truly be guilty of being 
inconsistent when he claims that man is absolutely free and unfree at the same time.  
To say that freedom is limited or situational refers to the idea that freedom 
must exist in a context. In examining the idea of “context”, three terms are closely 
related. They are facticity, coefficient of adversity and situation. Also, freedom that is 
situated suggests that there is a limit to freedom. In discussing practical freedom, I 
would also be investigating Sartre’s ambiguous use of the word “limit”. When Sartre 
refers to limits to freedom (practical unfreedom), the word “limit”218 is used in rather 
unique ways. 
                                                 
218 Note that Sartre’s explanation of the limits to freedom does not suggest a freedom that is restricted. 
Sartre’s conviction and exaltation of man’s absolute freedom is featured prominently in Being and 
Nothingness. This view is ascribed to the early existentialist writings of Sartre. Margaret Whitford, a 
critic of Sartre’s theory of freedom observes that there is a “break” in Sartre’s thoughts. According to 
Whitford, Sartre’s later writings repudiated his earlier views. Sartre admits that man’s freedom is indeed 
restricted. Margaret Whitford suggests that this “break” is a result of Sartre’s radical conversion to 
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3.3.1 Facticity as Limitation 
 
To understand if the freedom that Sartre purports is limited, I need to examine 
three concepts that Sartre makes reference to in his discussion of freedom. The three 
concepts are - facticity, coefficient of adversity and situation. 
“Freedom always presupposes facticity, and a free act cannot occur, nor can the 
idea of a free act even be rendered intelligible, except against a background of 
facticity.”219 Freedom needs to operate in the realm of a given and this is what Sartre 
describes as facticity. Facticity refers to the unchangeable220 aspects of our existence 
such as the fact that I am a female, born in Singapore, am born to a middle class family 
etc.  
The relationship between facticity and freedom is one of inter-dependence.221 
Facticity emerges as an obstacle only in the light of the Fundamental project that I 
have chosen. Freedom is illuminated by the project chosen and in an inter-dependent 
way. Freedom can only emerge in a context of facticity. An example will further 
illustrate this point. I have chosen the project of scaling Mount Everest in the 
Himalayas. The task of scaling the mountain will be tough as the terrain is difficult, the 
weather is cold, and unpredictable as one treks higher into the mountain. And there is a 
possibility of succumbing to altitude sickness. In itself, Mount Everest is neutral, a 
given that exists outside my consciousness. However, the mountain and the associated 
                                                                                                                                             
Marxism. However, since this thesis focuses on Sartre’s exposition of ontological and practical freedom 
in Being and Nothingness, Sartre’s presentation of freedom in CDR  is more influenced by the 
restriction on freedom posed by the social and political milieu in France then, The definition of freedom 
in CDR will not square so neatly with what Sartre is trying to discuss in Being and Nothingness.  
219 Detmer, p. 41 
220 Facticity remains unchangeable as long as we choose to not overcome it or remain in bad faith and 
not face the anguish of being completely responsible for changing and determining the situation that 
confronts us.   
221 Detmer, p. 41 
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experiences of climbing the mountain become obstacles only in the light of my freely 
chosen project of scaling Mount Everest.  
We are free because man is a finite being who is not omnipotent. There are 
options we have to choose from as there are things we can and cannot do. It is through 
choosing from these options that man is free. An omnipotent being needs no choice as 
everything is possible. Hence, we can see from this example “the inextricable 
connection of freedom and facticity…Without facticity freedom would not exist – as a 
power of nihilation and of choice – and without freedom, facticity would not be 
discovered and would have no meaning.”222
In the same way, for Whitford, freedom in a situation (practical freedom) just 
means having a context (facticity) in which our ontological freedom can be manifested. 
The free consciousness “is obliged to exist in a situation in order to exist at all.”223 The 
situation then becomes a condition in which freedom can be exhibited.   
Detmer, like Whitford, recognises that freedom is “dependent” or has a 
“borrowed existence.”224 In fact, like Detmer, he goes on to assert that the relationship 
between freedom and facticity is one of interdependence.225 The example of a 
discriminated Afro-American can be used to further explain this. The Ku Klux Clan 
poses as an obstacle for the discriminated black American as the latter has chosen the 
belief (project) that all Americans should be treated equally. Freedom can only be 
realised if the brutal and discriminatory treatment (facticity) of black Americans is 
removed. Hence, free choice can only occur when we see ourselves as finite or have 
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224 Refer to my quotation from Thepsophon on the previous page. 
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desires that are not realised. Facticity acts as the necessary resistance,226 a background 
against which freedom can be asserted. This illustrates the interdependence of freedom 
and facticity for “[w]ithout facticity, freedom would not exist – as a power of 
nihilation and of choice – and without freedom, facticity would not be discovered and 
would have no meaning.”227 The relationship between facticity and freedom is a 
paradoxical and yet dynamic one – it both limits freedom and makes it possible in the 
first place.  
 
3.3.2 Coefficient of Adversity as Limitation 
 
 The concept of the co-efficient of adversity is a term “which Sartre borrows 
from Gaston Bachelard. [It] refers not simply to the requirement of my freedom always 
to find it operating within a realm of external facts (facticity), but rather to the fact that 
these external objects and states of affairs may put up actual resistance to my freely 
undertaken projects.”228
 There is an essential difference between facticity and the coefficient of 
adversity. Facticity is unchangeable while the coefficient of adversity is a doubly 
relative concept and admits of degrees, “[t]hat is, while there are always an infinite 
number of facts which apply to me and to my situation, no matter what my project may 
happen to be, the degree to which my project is restricted by factors external to my 
consciousness clearly depends upon the project I choose and upon the nature of these 
                                                 
226 This resistance has been referred in my earlier discussion in chapter one as the “coefficient of 
resistance”. 
227 BN, p. 495-496 
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external factors.”229 It is a doubly relative project as it is relative to the project chosen 
and the extent to which the external factor is seen as an easy or difficult task based on 
the project chosen. The idea that the coefficient of adversity admits of degrees can be 
illustrated by Sartre’s example in Being and Nothingness. 
…the rock will not be an obstacle if I wish at any cost to 
arrive at the top of the mountain. On the other hand, it will 
discourage me if I freely fix limits to my desire of making the 
projected climb. Thus the world by coefficient of adversity 
reveals to me the way in which I stand in relation to the ends 
which I assign myself, so that I can never know if it is giving 
me information about myself or about it. 230
 
From the passage above, again the crag as a coefficient of adversity is relative to the 
project that I have chosen. If I decide that I would want to reach the base camp of 
Mount Everest within two weeks, scaling the treacherous terrain will be seen as a 
coefficient of adversity that is of a tougher degree. However if my aim is merely to 
sight-see, there will be less pressure to complete the route within a restricted period of 
time. Furthermore, if the trekking becomes too tough and I have already enjoyed the 
magnificent sights of the Everest Range that I wanted to see, I could abort the trek 
without getting to the base camp of Mount Everest. In this case, the coefficient of 
adversity will be of an easier degree based on a simpler project I have chosen.  
 Mount Everest as a coefficient of adversity is also relative to the external 
factors that happen to be present. The project will admit of a higher degree of difficulty 
if I were to meet with inclement weather resulting in poor visibility or a landslide in 
the mountain. On the contrary, the project will be of an easier degree if the weather is 
favourable for trekking.  
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 However, a more complex issue arises here. It is difficult to determine 
precisely the role of consciousness and factors external in any case of adversity.231 If I 
were to encounter difficulty in scaling the mountain, would it be because of the lack of 
discipline in training myself for the trek, weakness of mind in enduring the rigour of 
the trek, or simply the case that I have a weak constitution? How does Sartre attribute 
the adversity faced to the role of consciousness and to insurmountable external 
constraints (weak constitution)? While these are important considerations, the point 
here is not to what extent consciousness or facticity poses as an adversity. The 
question above forces us to consider the individual role played by consciousness or 
facticity. These two concepts cannot be considered in isolation. Freedom emerges in a 
situation where consciousness confronts facticity.   
 Having considered the different aspects of the discussion on the coefficient of 
adversity, it remains true that there are real limitations to our freedom. Although the 
mountain does dictate the project that I want to adopt, it remains a brute fact whether 
the crag “will or will not lend itself to scaling.”232 The limitation Sartre uses in this 
case is rather unique. 233 The crag does not limit the significance I confer on it. The 
crag as an adversity only prevents me from conferring any kind of significance on it.234 
It does not limit my freedom to choose but the range of choices that are available. 
3.3.3 Situation as Limitation 
 My situation refers to “the result of the confrontation between my consciousness and 
facts external to it at this particular time and place. Consequently, the situation is 
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neither subjective nor objective.”235 Situation does not refer to anything subjective as it 
does not stem from our consciousness, a project that we formulate. Situation is also not 
objective as it does not refer to the sum of external facts. Sartre explains the notion of 
situation in the following passage. 
[It] can be considered neither as the free result of a freedom 
nor as the ensemble of the constraints to which I am subject; it 
stems from the illumination of the constraints by freedom 
which gives to it its meaning as constraints. 236
 
In Sartre’s discussion of the theory of freedom, the term “situation” plays a pivotal role. 
According to Sartre, all freedom must be situated. In fact, “I am never free except in 
situation”237, that “for the for-itself, to exist and to be situated are one and the same”238, 
“that ‘being-in-situation’ …characterizes the for-itself,”239 and that “being situated is 
an essential and necessary characteristic of freedom.”240 Though paradoxical, what 
Sartre is proposing here is not freedom in the sense that one is omnipotent and free to 
do anything.  This is not what he is referring to when he says that freedom is absolute. 
For freedom to be meaningful it must exist in a context, and freedom can be created in 
that context. In every context or situation, only a limited range of possibility is 
available. Far from constraining my freedom, freedom is seen only in situations when 
my project confronts the obstacles that lay in the way of my attaining the end of my 
project.  
 It is important to point out here that my situation or limited range of choices 
does not determine my choice,241 it does not in any way force me to make any decision. 
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The freedom that one has in the situation is dependent on one’s interpretation of the 
situation.  
 
After explaining the two types of freedom, it is clear why the Inconsistency 
Objection is not a valid criticism of Sartre’s theory of freedom. The main criticism is 
that Sartre attributes two traits, “absoluteness” and “limit” to freedom. The answer to 
this simple objection is to refer these critics to the fact that freedom is absolute and 
limited. Ontological freedom is absolute while practical freedom is limited.  
While this objection may be a rather weak attack on Sartre, the issues 
highlighted deserve attention. They are: 
1) As ontological freedom is absolute, nothing external could limit our ontological 
freedom. This could result in a kind of internal freedom that is ineffectual 
(practically). 
2) There is a logical problem with ontological freedom. Man is always 
condemned to be free. Freedom is absolute, as there is no possibility that he is 
not free. The question raised was, “if man were not originally trapped or not 
free in the first place, how can freedom be achieved?  
3) The relationship between ontological freedom and practical freedom is one of 
interdependence. What does Sartre mean by this?  
 
3.4 Sartrean Terminology 
 
 Sartre’s use of certain terms in Being and Nothingness is unique and peculiar 
to the context of Sartre’s discussion. This is so as Sartre’s objective in writing Being 
and Nothingness is specific. His treatise on freedom is part of his project to present his 
views on phenomenological ontology, and a discussion on ontology inevitably focuses 
 68
on the “how” rather than the “why” of a world, reality and in this case, freedom. His 
theory is not a metaphysical theory and yet is attacked by many as a metaphysical 
discussion of freedom. The description of his theory takes centre-stage in Sartre’s 
phenomenological ontology. Barnes explains it as follows. 
 
Hitherto we have for the most part kept ourselves within the 
confines of ontology. And this is proper since Sartre had 
subtitled his book “An Essay on Phenomenological 
Ontology.” Mistakes are often made by those who would treat 
the work as a metaphysics. Sartre states clearly his distinction 
between the two: Ontology studies “the structures of being of 
the existent taken as a totality”; it describes the conditions 
under which there may be a world, human reality, etc. It 
answers the questions “How?” or “What” and is description 
rather than explanation. For this reason it can state positively. 
Metaphysics, on the other hand, is concerned with origins and 
seeks to explain why there is this particular world (italics my 
own). 242
 
A clear and precise understanding of the description used by Sartre is of utmost 
importance if one is to grasp the ideas that Sartre is describing in Being and 
Nothingness.  In particular, the two different senses of freedom are often interpreted 
and criticised on empirical grounds (as seen in the Inconsistency Objection). Sartre 
consistently argues in Being and Nothingness that freedom should not be understood in 
the “common sense” or the empirical sense of the word.  
 
 
…it is necessary to point out to “common sense” that the 
formula “to be free” does not mean “to obtain what one has 
wished” but rather “by oneself to determine oneself to wish” 
(in the broad sense of choosing)…The discussion which 
opposes common sense to philosophers stems from a 
misunderstanding: the empirical and popular concept of 
“freedom” which has been produced by historical, political, 
and moral circumstances is equivalent to “the ability to obtain 
the ends chosen.” The technical and philosophical concept of 
freedom, the only one which we are considering here, means 
only the autonomy of choice. It is necessary, however, to note 
that the choice, being identical with acting, supposes a 
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commencement of realization in order that the choice may be 
distinguished from the dream and the wish (italics my own).243  
 
The confusion in the different words used on freedom has been brought up in the 
Inconsistency Objection. Identifying the confusion will be useful in helping me bring 
Sartre’s exposition of ontological and practical freedom into sharper focus. 
 
3.4.1 Equivocal Use of “Absolute” and “Limited” 
 
Sartre’s terminologies can be confusing to many if they take Sartre as using 
these terms univocally, where the meanings of terms are consistent and the same 
throughout his arguments. The univocal use of terms is vital if comparisons are made 
in the argument.  In Sartre’s discussion of freedom in Being and Nothingness, he does 
compare and especially demonstrate that ontological freedom is contrasted with 
practical freedom. He states that practical freedom is the “reverse side”244 of 
ontological freedom. While it is true that ontological freedom is different from 
practical freedom, the definitions of these two terms are not mutually exclusive. The 
definitions of these two types of freedom are interdependent. 
 Let me first begin by explaining the kind of comparison that Sartre is not 
making. In our ordinary understanding of “comparison”, the qualities on which the 
comparison is made must be similar. For example, in order to compare and distinguish 
an intelligent person from a less intelligent one, the qualities used to compare the two 
persons must be the same. There must be an agreement that their IQ (intelligent 
quotient) scores will be used for comparison. The comparison will be an invalid one if 
A has been identified as the more intelligent one if the decision is made on his higher 
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EQ (emotional quotient) scores and B as less intelligent as his IQ scores are lower. To 
put it in the terms of syllogism, “intelligent” should be used univocally throughout the 
comparison.  
However, this is not the way comparisons are made in Sartre’s treatise on 
freedom. For Sartre, certain terminologies are used equivocally not univocally when 
comparisons are made between ontological and practical freedom. The meanings of 
these terminologies shift as they are relative. This means the words take on certain 
meanings in certain contexts. “Absolute” and “limited” are two prime examples. The 
confusion seen in (1) 245 arises because critics have not been careful in detecting the 
equivocal use of these two terms. However, the equivocal use of “absolute” and 
“limited” does not result in the Fallacy of Equivocation. Equivocation is an “informal 
fallacy that can result when an ambiguous word or phrase is used in different senses 
within a single argument.”246 This is so as “[c]ertain forms of argument that are valid 
for nonrelative terms break down when relative terms are substituted for them.”247 The 
following is an example from Introduction to Logic. 
 
 
The argument “an elephant is an animal; therefore a gray 
elephant is a gray animal is perfectly valid. The word “gray” is 
a nonrelative term. But the argument “an elephant is an animal; 
therefore a small elephant is a small animal” is ridiculous. The 
point here is that “small” is a relative term: a small elephant is 
a very large animal.248
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The Fallacy of Equivocation is detected in the example in the quotation above (“an 
elephant is an animal; therefore a small elephant is a small animal”). This is so as the 
term “small” is a relative term but used as a nonrelative term in the example. This 
makes the conclusion of the argument, “therefore a small elephant is a small animal” 
invalid. For the comparison between the elephant and animal in the above mentioned 
argument to be a valid one, the quality on which the comparison is based must be a 
non-relative term e.g. the colour gray.  
The Fallacy of Equivocation will not happen if we recognise that the 
comparison made is based on terms that are relative. “Absolute” and “limited” are 
terms that are relative and used equivocally throughout his arguments in Being and 
Nothingness. The comparison that Sartre is making in Being and Nothingness is for 
Sartre to explain the different kinds of freedom that he is rejecting and the new 
definitions of freedom that Sartre is constructing. The proponents of the Inconsistency 
Objection have failed to distinguish between the different (relative) senses of the word. 
 
3.4.2 Different Senses of “Absolute” and “Limited” 
 
“Absolute” and “limited” take on different meaning in his discussion of 
ontological and practical freedom. He vacillates between these senses but an accurate 
identification of the different meanings will clear the cloud of ambiguity and confusion 
about Sartre’s discussion of freedom. From textual evidence, “absolute” and “limited” 
are used in the ontological and empirical senses of these words. A third sense (logical) 
is imposed on him by the proponents of the Inconsistency Objection but this sense of 
the term is not used by Sartre at all. The following are ways in which “absolute” and 
“limited” are used by Sartre and the proponents of the Inconsistency Objection. 
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 a) “Absolute” freedom refers to the condition of or quality of freedom.  
b) “Absolute” freedom refers to being able to do anything. It is synonymous to 
omnipotence. 
c) “Absolute” freedom connotes success (physically, the person must be free). 
d) Freedom is “limited” as empirically, there are options we cannot effect 
practically.  
e) Freedom is “limited” as it is situated. 
f) Freedom is “limited” as there are parameters to the options that comport to the 
situation one is involved in. 
In (1), ontological freedom is seen as an inner and ineffectual freedom for three 
reasons. Firstly, (1) ignores the fact that Sartre does not intend ontological freedom 
(and practical freedom) to be understood in isolation. Ontological freedom and 
practical freedom are interdependent concepts. Ontological freedom is a necessary 
condition for practical freedom while practical freedom “supports”249 ontological 
freedom. “[C]onsciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself.”250 
Marcuses’ accusation that freedom is internal stems from the fact that his criticism has 
ignored the supporting role that practical freedom plays in Sartre’s Theory of Freedom.  
Secondly, ontological freedom is seen as an internal and ineffectual freedom as 
there is confusion in the understanding of how Sartre uses “absolute” in discussing 
ontological freedom. Marcuse has taken Sartre to mean “absolute” as in (b) that is, to 
mean omnipotence (empirically), and (c) where freedom must be seen in a physical 
manifestation of a free act. “Absolute” freedom does not suggest omnipotence. 
“Absolute” is not used in the sense of “absolute” freedom as we would normally 
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understand, where it refers to the fact that there is no restriction to what one can do. In 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, “absolute” means “having complete 
power; without limit.”251 However, this is not what Sartre means by absolute freedom. 
Absolute power does not mean omnipotence where man can do anything. It would be 
ludicrous as it is impossible for everyone to, for example, flap our wings and take off 
to the sky like birds. We can choose to flap our wings and take off to the sky like birds. 
However, having absolute power to choose and having absolute power to do anything 
successfully are different. In Sartre’s ontology, to be free (absolute) is a metaphysical 
necessity. To be is to be free. The success of ontological freedom lies in choosing, and 
so ontological freedom is always a successful freedom since nothing limits my 
choosing, not even the choice to fly like birds. The freedom we have lies not in the fact 
that we can take off and fly, but in choosing. Ontological freedom does not necessitate 
a corresponding freedom to be seen physically (when we flap our wings) for it to be 
considered absolute. 
Since Sartre is discussing ontological freedom, he cannot be referring to the 
idea that man can be empirically free in all circumstances. However, in accusing Sartre 
of postulating an ineffectual internal freedom, Marcuse is also relegating Sartre’s idea 
of freedom to the level where consciousness is omnipotent mentally. It could think of 
all kinds of possibilities and these thoughts cannot be restrained or undermined by 
what might happen empirically. In the example of the slave, his freedom would be 
internal and ineffectual if what Sartre means by absolute ontological freedom is for the 
slave in chains to ignore the fact that he is bound. The slave is absolutely free to 
conjure all kinds of thoughts like “I am free to write a poem about my imprisonment”, 
“I am free to think that the imprisonment will be useful in helping me empathise with 
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slaves in a similar predicament and hence offer them solace” and so on. While these 
are not possibilities that Sartre will reject, this is not the sense he is referring to when 
he says that ontological freedom is “absolute.”  
 A recourse to the structure of consciousness is vital here. Choice and 
consciousness are the same thing. Consciousness is nothingness. It is not a thing. It is 
action or the activity of nihilation. This refers to the transphenomenality of 
consciousness, in that it is always transcending itself and engaged in a succession of 
nihilation. It is a perpetual flight, an unbroken activity. Ontological freedom refers to 
this activity of consciousness. Consciousness is a continuous transcendence. Hence, 
ontological freedom is consciousness’s freedom to continuously transcend itself. It is 
in this sense that freedom is absolute. “Absoluteness” refers to the activity of 
consciousness that is a never ceasing nothingness. It is in this sense that man is 
condemned to be free, as to be is to nihilate. Hence, “absolute” does not refer to 
omnipotence; it describes the activity of consciousness. Consciousness’s striving 
towards the Fundamental Project is the freedom that we have ontologically.  
 Thirdly, the meaning of “limit” in (1) should be understood ontologically. 
When the proponents of the Inconsistency Objection state that freedom is absolute, as 
there is nothing in the external environment that can limit its freedom, they are 
referring to “limit” used in the empirical sense of the word. The correct use of “limit” 
is seen in (e) and (f). Empirically, “limit” is the opposite of omnipotence. It suggests 
that there are options that we cannot choose from. However, “limit” here does not refer 
to being able to choose A, B, C, D and not E, F, G, H. There are no options we cannot 
choose from, but not all options are within our choice. The options available are 
opened up or revealed by our Fundamental Project. Hence, it is never the case of being 
able to only choose A, B, C, D and not E, F, G, H, but given the project of scaling the 
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crag, A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H are my options in that situation. I can choose not A, 
not B but it is never the case that I cannot choose A or B given the situation I am in. 
“Limit” used in the empirical sense of the word in (1) does not mean a restriction of 
choice, but the parameters of choice that are available in the light of the Fundamental 
Project chosen. 
It is true that ontological freedom or the nihilating activity of the mind is not 
limited by objects of consciousness. Going back to the example of the seemingly 
insurmountable crag, the crag itself does not limit my choice of scaling it.  I am still 
free to decide to scale it. “Limit” is not posed by the objects of consciousness but how 
consciousness perceives the project of scaling the crag. The coefficient of adversity or 
the resistance that the crag poses is determined by consciousness. If I choose to see 
altitude sickness, the physical rigor of making the climb, fatigue and my lack of mental 
tenacity as resistance, the “limit” posed by the crag will be great. Similarly, the crag 
will be revealed as something more manageable if the limit I see scaling the crag is a 
matter of discipline. For example, I need to discipline myself to adopt a training 
regime so that I can be physically and mentally ready for the climb. The resistance put 
up by the crag would be of a lesser degree.  
Hence, freedom is deemed an inner and ineffectual kind if one is looking at 
“limit” only as it is used in (d). “Limit” when contrasted with “absolute” in the 
discussion of ontological freedom must be understood as limit as far as the “limit” is 
revealed by consciousness. It is never “limit” in the empirical sense of the word (d) per 
se. Its meaning is dependent on consciousness. Although I have established that “limit” 
cannot be a term that stands alone in the empirical sense of the word and dependent on 
consciousness, this does not make the meaning of “limit” arbitrary and ambiguous.  To 
have a better understanding of the “limit” that Sartre is expounding in his discussion of 
 76
ontological freedom, the parameter of choice we are presented with by our facticity, as 
revealed by our project, deserves further explanation here.  
Our facticity sets a parameter for our choice. Facticity suggests 
unchangeabililty.  For example, I cannot change the fact that I am born Chinese or 
born in Singapore. I cannot choose to change that fact that I was born a Singaporean.252 
Hence, my choices are limited because I cannot change “my facticity.”  Sartre’s words 
explain this. 
 
…far from being able to modify our situation at our whim, we 
seem to be unable to change ourselves. I am not “free” either 
to escape the lot of my class, of my nation, of my family, or 
even to build up our own power or my fortune or to conquer 
my most insignificant appetites or habits. I am born a worker, 
a Frenchman, a hereditary syphilitic, or a tubercular. The 
history of a life, whatever it may be, is the history of a 
failure.253
 
…freedom can exist only as restricted since freedom is choice. 
Every choice…supposes elimination and selection; every 
choice is a choice of finitude. Thus freedom can be truly free 
only by constituting facticity as its own restriction.254
 
 
Facticity or our situation does “limit” our freedom as what is “limited” are the 
possibilities that are available to us in each situation for us to obtain our ends. The 
word “limit” does not refer to the idea that there is a myriad of possibilities that are 
available for us to choose from but that we cannot choose from them. All the 
possibilities available are “situational”; the freedom of choice will be made among the 
possibilities that are presented to you.255 Possibilities that are “not rigorously involved 
                                                 
252 One can certainly choose to change his or her race and skin colour later through cosmetic procedures 
but this does not alter the fact that he or she was born a particular race.  
253 BN, p. 481 
254 BN, p. 495. This passage should give pause to those who equate “absolute freedom” with 
“unrestricted freedom”. 
255 See my discussion of this point on page 28 of chapter one. 
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in [our] own action”256 should not be considered. Any free action taken (or choice 
made) should comport with the ensemble of possibilities in that situation (our 
possibility and not the possibility that are independent of us).  
Going back to the same example,257 as long as “X” is working with his 
comrades on realising the dream of propagating Marxism, this dream remains a 
possibility for “X”. He cannot stretch this freedom or the possibility of realising the 
dream when he dies. He becomes practically unfree not because he is “physically 
disengaged” from the world but because the possibility of realising the Marxist dream 
is no longer his. It becomes a possibility for his comrades that he has no control over, a 
possibility that he has no access to. Hence, man is practically free as he can freely 
choose from any of the possibilities that comport with his situation. He can even 
choose not to go for any of the possibilities available. The possibilities can change 
when the situation changes. This point is summarised by Whitford in the following. 
 
Freedom in a situation means that we are free to choose 
between the alternatives offered by the situation, but Sartre 
admits that we might not want to choose any of the 
alternatives. The situation conditions our choice and 
determines our freedom to obtain our ends. So although man is 
totally free in the first sense (ontological freedom), in order to 
extend his freedom in a situation, it is necessary to change his 
situation (italics my own).258
 
 
To sum up the discussion in this section, “absolute” and “limited” are terms that 
cannot be understood in isolation or in the ordinary sense of the words. The confusion 
in (1) results in taking absolute to mean (b), a kind of mental omnipotence rather than a 
condition of existence in (a) where to exist is to be ontological free. Ontological 
freedom refers to the nihilating activities of consciousness that man is “condemned” to. 
                                                 
256 Marino, p. 353 
257 See page 28 for the example of the man who wants to realise his dream of propagating Marxism.  
258 Whitford, p. 57 
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The confusion in (1) is also a result of defining “limit” only as (d). “Limit” in Sartre’s 
ontology is always tagged to the ideas mentioned in (e) and (f), that freedom is always 
situated and a situation necessarily implies a parameter revealed by consciousness. 
“Absolute” and “limit” are used equivocally, and the complexity and sophistry of 
Sartre’s ontology call for a careful understanding of the equivocal use of these terms. 
 
3.4.3 Logical Problems and Freedom 
 
A logical problem is highlighted in 3.2.3. The question raised was: if man 
cannot be trapped or not free in the first place, how can freedom be attained?  
Again, this question is constructed based on the empirical understanding of the 
word “absolute” freedom. If “absolute” freedom were to be seen in the sense used in 
(b), then it would make sense to talk about freedom that can be stopped or freedom that 
could be trapped. The above-mentioned question is nonetheless a relevant one, and yet 
it should be rephrased. While men are all ontologically free, this freedom is to be 
achieved by ourselves. We are solely responsible for our freedom. This freedom is not 
a passive given (essence) but is spontaneous. The questions that will help us 
understand absolute freedom better here would be firstly, “What does it mean to be 
‘ontologically unfree’ (when unfree is not used in the empirical sense)?” Secondly, 
“under what circumstance would ontological freedom not be realised?” 
This objection to Sartre’s concept of ontological freedom could be attributed to 
a rather narrow understanding of Sartre’s use of “absolute ontological freedom.” This 
objection stems from a preoccupation with the logical implication of the word freedom. 
The “logical necessity”259 of freedom is rejected by Sartre in Being and Nothingness as 
                                                 
259 BN, p. 438 
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it attributes to freedom an essence, that freedom is a concept that can be defined and 
named. This runs contrary to the crux of Sartre’s ontology, namely, existence precedes 
essence and to exist is to be free. Freedom does not have an essence as it cannot be 
described. “How then are we to describe an existence which perpetually makes itself 
and which refuses to be confined in a definition?”260 Furthermore, Sartre explains that 
freedom must be understood as “the existent itself in its particularity.”261 The point that 
Sartre is making here is that every experience of freedom is different for each 
individual. There is no common or essential (essence) trait in all free acts.  
Critics who see the need for a logical explanation of freedom have missed the 
existential explanation of Sartre’s idea of absolute freedom. Logically, the negation of 
freedom is to be trapped and be denied the freedom to choose. However, this is never 
the case for Sartre. For Sartre, the negation of freedom is the negation of existence. 
Human liberty is co-extensive with human existence. To be is to act; not to act is to 
cease to be. 262 To exist is to be free. It is the defining characteristic of human beings. 
In fact, freedom for Sartre is a “pure factual necessity.”263 Hence, the opposite of 
ontological freedom is to be ontologically “unfree”, and it is never the case that man is 
not absolutely free ontologically. 
What then is the meaning of being “ontologically unfree?” To further illustrate 
this point, according to Whitford, we are absolutely free in the ontological sense of the 
word because ontological or absolute freedom is a necessary condition of freedom. We 
are absolutely free (ontological freedom) because we possess the power of conscious 
choice. Without this power of conscious choice (ontological freedom), man would not 
                                                 
260 BN, p. 438 
261 BN, p. 438 
262 BN, p. 555 
263 BN, p. 439. The experience of freedom, like Descartes’ cogito, is something that possesses an 
indubitable and intuitively real quality. It is a factual necessity that we cannot not experience. 
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be free in any other sense.264 “Ontological freedom is the fact that men are free. It is 
that which distinguishes man from stones, mountains and other inanimate objects…all 
actions imply consciousness (of) action.”265 Ontological unfreedom can only be used 
on rocks, birds and all inanimate objects that do not have the ability of conscious 
choice. Also, as explained earlier, we are absolutely free as our ability to choose is not 
determined or subjected to causal influence from a universal human nature or a 
divinely determined universe. We are ontologically unfree when we are bound by a 
determined set of circumstances.  
 Detmer makes the same point in his discussion on the nature of ontological 
freedom. To Detmer, “ontological freedom is foundational to practical unfreedom; that 
practical unfreedom is only possible against a background of ontological freedom, with 
the implication that only an ontologically free being can be practically unfree, or for 
that matter, practically free.”266 This is precisely Sartre’s point when he asserts that “if 
man is not originally free, but determined once and for all, we cannot even conceive 
what his liberation might be?”267 Thomas C. Anderson explains Sartre’s reasoning 
perceptively in the following. 
 
If man is by nature determined, chained to being and its causal 
influence, then to speak of increasing his freedom in the 
concrete is absurd. Only what is by nature free can become 
more free in the concrete situations of the world…True, 
[man’s] situation should be improved so that he can more 
readily attain the goals of his choices and desires. His freedom 
to attain could be increased. Still, if his nature is such that his 
choices and desires remain the product of causal forces, he 
remains ontologically no more than a robot.268
 
                                                 
264 Whitford, p. 57 
265 Whitford, p. 56, 57 
266 Detmer, p. 66 
267 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1962. “Cartesian Freedom” in Literary and Philosophical Essays, trans. By 
Annette Michelson. New York: Colliers Books, p. 244 
268 Detmer, p. 66 
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Anderson has in the passage above made a clear point about ontological 
freedom being foundational to practical freedom. Take the example of X who is free to 
read a secret government document. X has the ability to do so and is not in anyway 
constrained by external factors. He is practically free to read the document. It is 
entirely conceivable that the fact that he is free to read the secret document, means that 
he has the ability to do so and is not constrained by external factors. However, 
hypothetically, X’s actions are causally determined. If the reading of the secret 
government document is hypothetically part of a pre-determined plan, then X is just 
acting in accordance with it. This act, to Sartre, would not be a free act at all. X is 
reading the secret government document because he has to and not because he is free 
to do so. This is a case of ontological unfreedom269 and the consequence of such a 
scenario is that there is not even a connection between ontological unfreedom with 
practical freedom. 270 We cannot speak of practical freedom or freedom of any sort if, 
as discussed in the example above, we are not ontologically free in the first place. 
Choice or freedom becomes meaningless as it will not change what has been pre-
determined practically. There is no need to choose, as our “decisions” and “free 
actions” are already determined.  
Ontological freedom sets us apart from inanimate objects, as every choice is a 
conscious choice. We are ontologically free to choose. Not choosing any other 
alternatives available is also a choice. When we do not see a connection between 
ontological freedom and practical freedom or unfreedom, we are mere beings adhering 
robotically to a chartered route in life.  
                                                 
269 A corollary point in Sartre’s philosophy here is the idea of bad faith. Even though man is absolutely 
free, he could choose not to acknowledge it. He could deceive himself into thinking that he does not 
have to be aware of the fact that he can choose. This is bad faith, or what could be described as 
ontological unfreedom.  
270 Detmer, p. 67 
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 For Sartre, “practical freedom means freedom to obtain freely chosen ends.”271 
If X is determined to read the secret government documents, he is not free in the 
ontological and the practical sense. Only an ontologically free being with the power of 
conscious choice can be enslaved or liberated from enslavement. Detmer uses Herbert 
J. Muller’s three conditions of freedom to bring Sartre’s rationale for stating that 
ontological freedom is foundational to practical freedom or unfreedom into sharper 
focus. For Muller, freedom is “the condition of being able to choose and to carry out 
purposes.”272 The conditions that make freedom possible are - “(1) the absence of 
external constraints; (2) practicable purposes, or an actual ability with available means; 
and (3) a power of conscious choice between significant known alternatives.”273 How 
does Muller’s theory of freedom further support Sartre’s insistence on ontological 
freedom being necessarily connected and foundational to practical freedom or 
unfreedom? We can compare the case of X who is free to read the secret government 
document, has the ability to read the document and is not in any way constrained by 
external forces with birds that are free to fly, have the ability to fly and are not 
constrained to spread their wings to fly. According to Detmer, birds have only satisfied 
two of the three necessary conditions of freedom laid down by Muller. There is an 
absence of external constraints as nobody prevents birds from flying. Birds have an 
actual ability and available means to fly. They can and are able to fly. It becomes 
apparent here that birds do not satisfy the third condition. They do not have the power 
of consciousness to choose or not choose from known alternatives. They have to fly. 
Birds do not have the power to choose, for example to fly today and not tomorrow. 
Although nothing stops them from not flying, they fly on a daily basis. The ability to 
fly, not the ability to choose, is the defining characteristic of birds. Hence, birds are not 
                                                 
271 Detmer, p. 67 
272 Herbert J, Muller, 1960.Issues of Freedom. New York: Harper and Brothers, p. 5 
273 ibid, p. 5 
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free. The concept is not applicable to them at all as the foundational condition is not 
present.  
 When applied to X who is free to read the secret government document, he is 
free. He has satisfied all three conditions listed by Muller. There are no external 
constraints, X has the ability to read the document and more importantly, X possesses 
the power of conscious choice between known alternatives. The power of conscious 
choice is ontological freedom and it is with this prerequisite that freedom manifested 
practically becomes meaningful. The usefulness of Muller’s conditions of freedom in 
sharpening Sartre’s insistence on ontological freedom being foundational to practical 
freedom is summarised aptly by Detmer below. 
 
Thus, while Muller maintains that one cannot be free without 
the power of conscious choice, Sartre underscores essentially 
the same point by drawing out its logical corollaries – namely, 
that a being that lacks the power of conscious choice cannot be 
enslaved, nor can the freedom of such a being be enhanced or 
diminished. Clearly, such a being cannot be enslaved, since 
the concept of slavery makes no sense if there is not some 
capacity for freedom which is being thwarted; and the freedom 
of such a being cannot be enhanced or diminished, because 
one cannot alter the quantity of a quality which is not present 
in the first place.274
 
 
Hence, to be absolutely free is synonymous with ontological freedom; it is the 
existential platform on which freedom could be exerted or thwarted practically. 
Detmer’s discussion above of “a being that lacks the power of conscious choice” is a 
demonstration and reaffirmation of the freedom that we cannot be denied. A free being 
must be ontologically free and never ontologically unfree (one who lacks the power of 
conscious choice). Hence, it can never be the case that we are originally trapped or 
                                                 
274 Detmer, p. 68 
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unfree and then set free (empirically). The logical problem identified is a result of 
using “absolute” in the empirical sense of the word.  
  
 As stated in (a), “absolute freedom” is a condition or quality of freedom. “[I]t is 
not something which exists over and above our free actions, but is rather a quality of 
all actions, in the same way as all actions imply consciousness (of) action”. Not 
everyone would want to exercise this freedom. They want to be absolved of the 
perpetual responsibility of their actions and be identified with the in-itself, the 
adherence to a determined human reality, the kind of reality being-in-itself is. This is 
one of the problems that Sartre wants to resolve in Being and Nothingness. 
 
One of the problems which Sartre faces in L’Être et le néant is 
how to explain, if human reality is not determined but free, 
why the majority of people spend the larger part of their lives 
masking their freedom from themselves. Although he (Sartre) 
begins by stating that man is totally free, he then finds himself 
in the position of having to account for the fact that there is 
some continuity in our experience and that the past appears to 
possess considerable weight. 275  
 
Ontological freedom is not realised as people live their lives in mauvaise foi or an 
inauthentic state of being. “In mauvaise foi, the pour soi seeks to be what it is (rather 
than what it is not and is not what it is), and repudiating its freedom, takes refuge in 
essence and identity and attempts at self-coincidence. It is an attempt to avoid coming 
face to face with the responsibility that freedom involves”276, the freedom constantly to 
be a nothingness, to continually nihilate and choose. We flee from this responsibility 
of being free and escape into mauvaise foi, which is the unreflecting being for-itself 
falling into the mode of existence of being-in-itself. The unreflecting being for-itself 
                                                 
275 Whitford, p. 68 
276 Whitford, p. 69 
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seeks to be determined than to determine its being by taking on the responsibility that 
accompanies freedom.  
 
To be wholly whatever it is, a waiter, a grocer, a judge, is the 
aim, too, of the man himself who is acting the 
part…conscious beings long for this safe, solid condition…So 
the aim of Bad Faith is to bring a man as near as possible to 
the condition of a thing …a pure waiter through and through, 
who has no more choice of how to behave than a robot-waiter 
has (italics my own).277
 
However, bad faith is not actually a choice. It is merely a “spontaneous attitude”278 
where one goes with the flow and is not aware of the ontological freedom that he 
possesses. 
 In this section that focuses on Sartre’s terminologies, I have explained that his 
terminologies are used the following ways. 
• Sartre’s terms are used equivocally. He uses terms like “absolute” and “limited” to 
demonstrate his theory’s break from the common sense of freedom. This is required 
as he compares and contrasts the absoluteness of ontological freedom and limited 
practical freedom with each other and with the other senses of freedom he rejects.  
• Sartre uses some terms in unique ways. “Limit”, “absolute” and “success” are some 
examples. Their meanings are peculiar to the context of his discussion in Being and 
Nothingness. Hence, one would only have an accurate reading of Sartre’s idea of 
freedom with an understanding of his ontological project in Being and Nothingness. 
• Sartre’s terms cannot be understood in isolation. The understanding of one word 
requires readers to see its dependence on another. For example, ontological freedom 
and practical freedom cannot be understood in isolation. 
 
                                                 
277 Warnock, Mary, 1967. Existential Ethics. London: Macmillan. p. 31 
278 Whitford, p. 69 
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3.5 “Freedom is Both Absolute and Limited” – A Reconstruction 
  
So far, I have suggested that the logical and empirical sense of “absolute” 
should be rejected in Sartre’s discussion of ontological freedom. “Limited” is also used 
in the sense that does not suggest the denial or restrictions of options but that the 
situation presents a parameter of options from which we can choose from. The “limit” 
we will see is rooted in experience hence, it is not incorrect that it is used in the 
empirical sense of the word to demonstrate what Sartre means by practical freedom.  
 Sartre says that practical freedom is the “reverse side” of ontological freedom. 
Does this mean that these two types of freedom are different? If so, does the difference 
lie in the fact that one is ontologically absolute while the other is practically limited? If 
this were the case, then the following would be a possible and consistent formulation 
of the statement that “freedom is both absolute and limited.” 
i) Freedom is absolute in the ontological sense of the word. 
ii) Freedom is limited in the practical sense of the word. 
iii) Ontological freedom is different from practical freedom. 
iv) Freedom that is absolute (ontological) is different from freedom that 
is limited (empirical/practical). 
v) “Freedom” refers to both ontological and practical freedom. 
vi) Hence, freedom is both absolute and limited. 
While the above-mentioned formulation takes into account the difference between 
ontological freedom and practical freedom,279 it has ignored the relationship between 
                                                 
279 The difference is vital for if there isn’t two types of freedom, Sartre cannot claim that freedom can be 
absolute and limited. 
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these two types of freedom. This is a result of a compartmentalised understanding of 
Sartre’s ontological and practical freedom. 
The relationship between ontological freedom and practical freedom is one of 
interdependence. The conclusion that Sartre is trying to draw here is not that freedom 
is absolute and limited, as he is referring to ontological freedom as being absolute and 
practical freedom as being limited. The following is what Sartre means when he says 
that freedom is both absolute and limited. 
1) Ontological freedom is absolute. 
2) But ontological freedom has to be exhibited practically, that is, in practical 
freedom. 
3) Practical freedom is limited. 
4) Therefore, ontological freedom is both absolute ontologically and limited 
practically. 
5) Practical freedom is limited. 
6) But practical freedom makes sense only against the background of ontological 
freedom. 
7) Ontological freedom is absolute. 
8) Therefore, practical freedom is both limited practically and absolute 
ontologically.  
9) From (4) and (8), freedom (as both ontological and practical freedom) are  
absolute and limited. 
In conclusion, I have suggested that the Inconsistent Objection arises because 
many critics have read and examined some of Sartre’s terminologies in Being and 
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Nothingness in isolation. As a result of that, they think that Sartre is not consistent 
when he says “freedom is both absolute and limited”. 
 More sympathetic interpreters such as Detmer have a different take on this 
statement. According to them, Sartre is not inconsistent when he says “freedom is 
absolute and limited”. This is because what Sartre means is “[ontological] freedom 
is absolute and [practical freedom] is limited.”280 However, this interpretation is 
still unsatisfactory as it ignores the relationship (of interdependence) between 
ontological and practical freedom.  
 I maintain that the correct reading of the statement that “freedom is absolute 
and limited” should be “[ontological] freedom is (ontologically) absolute and 
(practically) limited and so is practical freedom”. I will be presenting my 
arguments for (9) in the next chapter.  In order to support my reading of Sartre in 







                                                 
280 This interpretation must take into consideration the correct senses of “absolute” and “limited” as they 
are used in Being and Nothingness. 
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4 The Interdependence of Ontological and Practical Freedom 
 
In the previous chapter, I have explained that much of the confusion and  
misreading of Sartre’s discussion of freedom is a result of not paying careful attention 
firstly to the fact that Sartre is discussing two types of freedom in Being and 
Nothingness. Secondly, the proponents of the Inconsistency Objection have also not 
noticed the equivocal use of certain terms. The words “absolute” and “limited”  take on 
different definitions in the different contexts Sartre refers to in discussing ontological 
and practical freedom. “Absolute” and “limited” can be used in the ontological and 
empirical senses of the word. “Absolute” seems more closely related to ontological 
freedom, while “limited” is more frequently associated with practical freedom. 
However, the two types of freedom, though different, should not be understood in 
isolation. The relationship of the two types of freedom is that of interdependence. 
Practical freedom is dependent on ontological freedom as it is invoked only insofar as 
it is reduced to a function of our ontological freedom. Hence, ontological freedom is 
foundational to practical freedom. Man cannot be considered practically free or unfree 
when he is not originally (ontologically) free.281 Ontological freedom is dependent on 
practical freedom as the material background on which ontological freedom can be 
manifested or understood.  
 In section 4.1, I will explain that ontological freedom is both absolute and 
limited. It is absolute as it is the condition of our existence. To exist is to be free. We 
cannot stop being free and hence condemned to exist in this condition. Ontological 
freedom is also limited as for freedom to be manifested or understood, it has to be 
exhibited practically. The “practical” exhibition or experience of ontological freedom 
                                                 
281 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1962. “Cartesian Freedom” in Literary and Philosophical Essays, trans. By 
Annette Michelson. New York: Colliers Books, p. 244 
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is the material background against which we understand ontological freedom. The 
concept of “body”282 discussed in section 4.1.1 represents the material background 
mentioned above. To put it in the words of Barnes, “[e]xperientially, the body is the 
focus of reference by which consciousness is located in the world.”283 In section 4.1.2, 
the ego284 is also used to explain the practical experience of ontological freedom. The 
Ego helps us have a unified experience of ontological freedom.   
 Section 4.2 explains how practical freedom is dependent on ontological 
freedom. Ontological freedom is the phenomenological background against which 
practical freedom can be invoked. Without the awareness or acknowledgement of our 
ontological freedom man cannot be said to be practically free or practically unfree.  
 It is only with this understanding of the relation between ontological and practical 
freedom that I could present the key thesis statement of my project - “freedom (both 
ontological and practical) is (both) absolute (ontologically) and limited (practically).” 
This, I believe is what Sartre means when he says that “freedom is both absolute and 








                                                 
282 A more exhaustive discussion of “body” can be found in Hazel E. Barnes’ article, “Sartre’s ontology: 
The revealing and making of being.” The section entitled “Embodied Consciousness” has an interesting 
discussion of the concept of “body” in Sartre’s consciousness. 
283 Barnes, p. 21 
284 “Ego” here is not used in the sense that is rejected by Sartre. I have explained this point in section 
1.1.2 of my thesis. “Ego” here does not refer to a subject residing in consciousness. For Sartre, 
consciousness is emptied of contents. Consciousness is nothingness. 
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4.1 Ontological Freedom is Absolute and Limited 
 
The following is a formulation of the argument that ontological freedom is 
absolute and limited.           
1) Ontological freedom is absolute. 
2) But ontological freedom has to be exhibited practically, that is, in practical   
freedom.                             
3) Practical freedom is limited 
4) Therefore, freedom is both absolute ontologically and limited practically. 
Premise (1) has been explained in chapters 1 and 2. Consciousness and freedom is 
not what it is and what it is not. Ontological freedom is absolute as consciousness is 
not an object, an ego that possesses an essence. Its existence is nothingness. 
Nothingness is the negating activities of consciousness. Freedom is transphenomenal, 
or the continuous activity of becoming what it is not (nihilation). Also, ontological 
freedom is the condition of existence. Ontological freedom is the foundation and hence 
a necessary condition of any kind of freedom that is to be exhibited practically.  
 Premise (2) answers questions on how ontological freedom can be understood 
since it is nothingness or the negating activity (ontological freedom) of consciousness. 
The negating activity of consciousness is always consciousness of something. That 
something is the intended object of consciousness as revealed by the Fundamental 
Project chosen. How is ontological freedom exhibited practically? Since the 
relationship between ontological freedom and practical freedom is one of inter-
dependence, how is ontological freedom dependent on practical freedom?  
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Practical freedom is the “background” on which ontological freedom is 
observed and understood. A comment on Sartre by Hazel E. Barnes285 will be helpful 
in understanding the “background” better. According to Barnes, when Sartre makes the 
phenomenological declaration “all consciousness is consciousness of something”, the 
meaning of that phrase when understood in basic everyday terms refers to “[w]e as 
human beings confront a brute, concrete reality that existed before the evolution of 
conscious life.” His declaration is established based on a “monistic materialism.”286 
Barnes explains monistic materialism in the following. 
 
By this term Sartre meant to indicate that there is no spiritual 
or mental activity that exists independent of matter. But this 
does not mean that conscious processes can be explained by 
the same kinds of laws that determine nonconscious chemical 
and physical reactions.287
 
In addition, according to Barnes, Sartre in Critique of Dialectical Reason states 
paradoxically that his philosophy is materialism. He gives attention to both matter and 
consciousness. 
 
Whatever object a consciousness intends, there is always a 
material substratum, whether it is physical or physiological, 
engrams in the brain, or the nebulous physical-chemical 
reaction that is said to accompany all thinking. “Everything 




However, the two quotations above do not suggest that consciousness is material or 
made of molecules. Consciousness is an activity and this (negating) activity is 
supported by a being that is not itself.289 In addition, consciousness is not a thing but 
                                                 
285 Barnes, Hazel E. 1992. “Sartre’s ontology: The revealing and making of being” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre edited by Christina Howells. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 20. 
Subsequent reference to this article will be denoted as Barnes, page number. 
286 Barnes, p. 14 
287 Barnes, p. 14 
288 Barnes, p. 17 
289 BN, p. 23 
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relates itself to a being that it is not. If consciousness is that being, then there will be 
no freedom to speak of as there will not be consciousness of something as 
consciousness is that something. The idea in the quote above is that the background 
against which ontological freedom is exhibited is matter and something concrete. 
Unlike consciousness that is intentional, the being (or background) is indifferent or 
neutral. This background or matter emerges as consciousness becomes aware of it. 
Consciousness “enfolds its objects in a shell of nothingness, thus making itself a 
reflection of them and a point of view on them. It is this that Sartre means when he 
says that “consciousness intends its objects”,  “consciousness reveals being” or that 
“being appears to consciousness.”290  
After establishing that the background on which ontological freedom is 
exhibited is material and intended by consciousness, I will discuss the body and ego as 
the background on which ontological freedom can be understood. Body and ego as the 
background for ontological freedom do not have to take a definite shape or must be 
tangible. This material background, as seen in body and ego explained in the sections 
below, refer to backgrounds that are grounded in our physical understanding of our 
world. These physical backgrounds could be something tangible like the freedom of 
the slave as seen in the removal of the shackles that bind him or her, or a concept 
(grounded physically) against which for-self becomes aware of itself as the revealer of 
the direct objects of consciousness. Body could also mean the intangible or imagined 
thought or idea of having the chains removed that the slave has chosen to work 
towards. In the second sense, freedom is exhibited in having the thought that “I” (ego 
that is understood physically and not as an immanent object) want to be set free. 
 
                                                 
290 BN, p. 15 
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 4.1.1     Body as the Experience of Ontological Freedom 
  
For ontological freedom to be exhibited practically, it can be seen and 
understood in the body. The manifestation of ontological freedom is depended on the 
body. This is not to say that ontological freedom cannot exist without a body. The 
body is a sufficient but not necessary condition for ontological freedom. “A condition 
is necessary for p if without it, p cannot hold. A condition is sufficient for p if with it p 
must hold.”291 When practical freedom is observed, ontological freedom must hold. 
However, even when practical freedom is not seen physically, man is still 
ontologically free.  
 “Body” here refers to being-for-itself and being-in-itself. According to Barnes, 
the body exists in three dimensions.  The three bodies are the experience of “my body” 
(first person), “your body” (second person) and the body of “others” (third person). 
The first experience relates to being-for-it-self while the other two dimensions relate to 
being-in-itself.  
 Firstly, my body is being-for-itself. Fundamentally, body is always being-for-
itself regardless of the active realisation of the other two dimensions of body. This is 
so as “being-for-itself is conscious body.”292 This point can be demonstrated by 
understanding how consciousness is related to being-for-itself. As an activity, 
consciousness is doubly dependent on being.293 The first dependence is such that 
consciousness cannot exist unless there is something to be revealed. Consciousness is 
always conscious of something. Consciousness is different from the being that is 
revealed, but its existence is supported by that being. And this activity of a being and 
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this being is being-for-itself. To be conscious is to nihilate. Being-for-itself is the 
awareness of being as consciousness in the activity of revealing. Without this (self) 
consciousness, it is merely an in-itself. A corpse is no longer a for-itself but an in-
itself.294   
The second dependence is the dependence on the in-itself, explained earlier as 
concrete and material. This does not reduce consciousness to body. As consciousness 
is always the consciousness of something, the dependence on in-itself here is that 
consciousness is not its direct object. It is the revealer of the object (in-itself) being 
revealed.  In sum, every intending act (ontological freedom) is positionally aware of 
the object (in-itself) it posits and non-positionally aware of itself as awareness (for-
itself).   
The for-itself is conscious body and Sartre tells us that body is the facticity of 
the for-itself ,295 which is also to say that consciousness exists embodied. It is body but 
not the body it is conscious of. Sartre explains in the following. 
 
Being-for-itself must be wholly body, and it must be wholly 
consciousness; it cannot be united with a body. 296
 
If for-itself is united with a body, it would be absurd for Sartre to speak of 
consciousness as consciousness of something that is not itself. Also, “being-for-itself is 
body” means that the for-itself is situated in the world. “To say that I have entered the 
world, ‘come to the world’ or that there is a world or that I have a body is one and the 
same thing.”297 The for-itself is conscious body. Its consciousness or ontological 
freedom is exhibited in that it “individualises” and “serves as a unifying centre of 
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reference, which makes it possible to distinguish between dream and reality.”298 
Although Sartre’s ontology is the account of how a being-for-itself is conscious not 
physiologically but phenomenologically, consciousness (being-for-itself) is always 
nihilating the body (being-in-itself) it is aware of. This awareness, translated into 
experience or empirically, gives the world (being-in-itself) a focus of reference. It is in 
this sense that for-itself is located in the world but is not the world. The for-itself is a 
point of view of the world, but it is a point of view “on which I cannot take a point of 
view.”299   
 The second and third dimension of body relates to being-in-itself. This is so as 
ontological freedom is the negating activity of consciousness and always a “going 
beyond” or transcendence. Transcendence, as explained in chapter two is 
consciousness’s ability to go beyond facticity to pursue what it desires. The second 
dimension is “my-body-for the –Other”300 or a body as it appears to another 
consciousness. It is the object of consciousness. What is transcended here is the 
Other’s (or your) body. My ontological freedom is exhibited in revealing or nihilating 
the movements and utterances “only by reference to a controlling subjectivity.”301 In 
fact “all my relations to that in-itself are coloured by my awareness of the hidden, 
governing presence of a for-itself.”302 This revelation is the relation or encounter I 
have with another for-itself. “I cannot grasp the for-itself directly, but its undeniable 
existence dominates my relations with the Other’s body.”303 This encounter is the 
practical exhibition of my ontological freedom. 
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 The third dimension is my-body-as-known-by-the-Other. Here, body comes 
close to pure being-in-itself. The body encountered is not another “for-itself” but the 
body compared to other bodies. For example, the body can be diagnosed as infected, 
diseased, not healthy and so forth. This my-body-as-known-by-the-Other is presented 
to consciousness as a vulnerability, dependent on external circumstances that are out of 
my control.304 Again, this third dimension of the body in the way it compares with 
other bodies is the practical exhibition of ontological freedom. 
 
4.1.2 Ego as the Experience of Ontological Freedom 
 
 The ego is a product of consciousness and it is being-in-itself. “The ‘I’ and the 
‘me’ are the result of the work of reflective consciousness, a consciousness that takes 
its awareness as its direct object.”305 It is not a subject. It was explained in chapter one 
that Sartre denies the existence of a transcendental ego. That would mean 
consciousness is an “I” or a thing with an essence and in the case of Descartes, a 
subject that thinks. This is not the case. Consciousness is an activity and the activity is 
intentional. Its intentional activity is transphenomenal, “a process of shooting out 
towards and revealing the objects.”306 In this sense, the “I” in Descartes’ cogito was, as 
it is an object of consciousness that has been transcended. 
 How then is the ego a practical exhibition of ontological freedom? Ontological 
freedom is understood practically because of the unity we see in our experiences. 
However, this is not to say that the ego that is the object of consciousness is necessary 
for unifying consciousness.307 As explained, something is a necessary condition for p if 
without p, it cannot hold. The patterns will be created by consciousness with or 
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without the existence of an ego, which is brought about by the reflective consciousness. 
The unification is the revealed “patterns” or “structures” by consciousness and the 
revelation is exhibited in a body or an ego. “It is not the case that it is the ‘I’ we 
encounter in consciousness that unifies all the representations of external objects, 
rather, the ‘I’ is made possible by the synthetic unity of our representations.”308 It is in 
this sense that we attribute this unity to an ego. How does this happen? Barnes explains 
it in the following passage. 
 
In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre explains how the ego 
comes into being. “It has been constituted by a consciousness 
reflecting on its own activities, ordering them in terms of 
imposed meanings and unifying them. The ego is fabricated 
out of the psychic residue of earlier experiences, and it is their 
unity. More important, consciousness is not the ego. The ego 
is not inside but outside it.309
 
What exactly is meant by the ego being “fabricated out of the psychic residue of earlier 
experiences?” This means the ego is a psychic being, the result of consciousness 
working on its own past.  
Consciousness makes the ego by unifying it own actions, qualities and its states. 
The unity we see in actions, qualities and its states is the unity we see in past, present, 
and the current projected activity of consciousness. This unity is explained in the act of 
counting in Being and Nothingness. While one is counting, someone comes and 
“awakens” you from the pre-reflective state of the act of counting. You immediately 
reflect on the act of counting but it is obvious that the reflection is not only of that 
moment and not the point when you drew out a coin to continue with the act of 
counting. You are awakened to the awareness that you are currently doing as part (of 
what you have been doing in the past hour or so and will continue to be doing) of a 
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series of acts amounting to the act of counting. Although the act is of the moment, the 
reflected moment carries with it the whole or synthesized act of counting. The whole 
experience as reflected by consciousness as “I am counting.” The “I” appears as an 
ego is used or created by consciousness to describe the unity we see in actions. The 
metaphor of a melody is aptly used by Sartre to describe ego. The melody is composed 
of separate notes that are related to each other. The melody does not create itself or the 
pattern but the pattern is understood as a melody.  
 
It (ego) is, rather, a synthetic ideal object, comparable in some 
respects to a melody which is composed of separate notes 
standing in a certain relation to each other and forming a 
recognisable pattern…no ego is at all found in pre-reflective 
consciousness…it is transcendent object, which turns out to 
be a continuing pattern of actions, states, and qualities.310  
 
 
Ontological freedom has to be exhibited practically here. Consciousness’s perpetual 
state of “not-to-be” (past, present and future) here is understood in the unity that we 
see. This unity is seen in the body of an ego.  
 However, it is also vital to point out that even though ego is the object of 
consciousness and is real as reflected by consciousness, there is a sense in which the 
ego may be “false.”311 The “true” ego is “fabricated” by consciousness. As a product 
of reflective consciousness, the ego is made up by consciousness. “Whatever kind of 
unity consciousness has imposed on its worked psychic matter, this unity is truly what 
consciousness has in fact constituted.”312 The “false” ego surfaces in bad faith. It is a 
fabrication of self-deception, a false ego. The “I” that we see in experiences is 
constituted not by the reflective being-for-itself but the ego being an in-itself. Though 
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seen and exhibited practically, it certainly cannot be the background for ontological 
freedom. Let me explain this “false” ego in greater detail. 
 The ego is false as it is not directed by the Fundamental Project. The “true” ego 
emerges as intended by the Fundamental Project. The relationship between the ego and 
the Fundamental Project is explained by Barnes in the following. 
 
If the fundamental project is the for-itself’s chosen orientation 
toward being, its way of making itself be, its nonreflective 
creation and pursuit of values, the process whereby it chooses 
to make itself, a “plan aware of itself,” to use Sartre’s own 
expression, then the ego is the crystallized reflection of what 
consciousness considers or imagines its fundamental project to 
be…the ego is consciousness’s interpretation of the traces left 
by the fundamental project.313  
 
If ego is intended and created by consciousness, but seen as in-itself (in the case of bad 
faith), then the patterns we see empirically are but the apparent spontaneity (not 
directional or intended) in patterns of behaviour. In-itself, without the conscious for-
itself, ego is seen as the creator of patterns like the genetic codes which as givens, 
determine the nature of conscious choice and the behaviour consequent to them. The 
apparent spontaneity is part of the self-deception or bad faith where one “shifts 
conveniently”314 from a being-for-itself to a being-in-itself. The lure of bad faith lies in 
the fact that one becomes determined and not a self-determining being. We do not have 
to face the anguish of our ontologically free consciousness. We do not have to be 
responsible for our actions and behaviour as they are what the in-itself is – destined 
and determined. “I am a thief as I have a criminal gene” or “I have poor academic 
results as I am not born intelligent” would be how the “false” ego will be seen. The “I” 
or ego creates your fate. This practical exhibition of ego is what Sartre and I will be 
rejecting here. A person in bad faith can still think that he/she is acting in a free 
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manner.  Although they are also expressions of “freedom” (though not ontological 
freedom), they are nonreflective responses and traps of bad faith. A consciousness on 
good faith is the kind of self-reflection that produces the ego and the consequent unity 
we see in our experiences.  
 In sum, ontological freedom is absolute and limited. The absoluteness of this 
freedom is explained by the structure and activity of consciousness. Ontological 
freedom cannot be understood merely in the ontological sense of the word. Ontological 
freedom is dependent and supported by a being that is not itself. It is so as 
consciousness is always intentional, a revelation of something. The revelation is the 
exhibition of ontological freedom. I have explained that the exhibition can be seen in 
the body and ego (only in good faith). Body and ego are limited as they are situated 
(seen in a particular way by the intending consciousness). Therefore, given the 
dependence of ontological freedom on practical freedom, ontological freedom is both 
absolute and limited. One further point needs to be made here. The dependence of 
ontological freedom on practical freedom should be described as a “resisting” or 
“negative” attachment. 
 
4.1.3 Resistance and Freedom 
 
The facticity of liberty is its attachment to the given by 
separation from which it comes into existence. My place, my 
body, my past, my fundamental relation to the other person: 




The statement above by Blackham clearly encapsulates the idea that ontological 
freedom has to be exhibited practically. Ontological freedom needs to be exhibited 
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practically as resisting body. He aptly calls it the “facticity of liberty”, an 
unchangeable aspect of freedom but Sartre’s idea of our freedom’s relation to the 
situation in which freedom is exhibited is that of “resisting attachment” and not mere 
attachment. The use of the word “attachment” or dependence of the given (facticity) 
mentioned by Blackham connotes a positive attachment, in which liberty could be 
understood only when manifested “successfully” in a free act. To be free then means 
the practicability of purpose and achieving (practically) what one wants. The 
consequence of such a positive attachment to the given could also be translated into the 
idea that in the absence of a “successful” manifestation of freedom, free choice is but a 
mere wish or aspiration and is not real unless it initiates in action. If so, in the example 
of the slave, freedom for him is either being free from slavery (free to walk out on his 
master) or only to dream of being set free.  
The reverse is true. “[L]iberty is lack of being in relation to a given being and 
not the emergence of a positive being.”316 The relation to the given being is to realise 
that the facticity is not what we want (a lack) and hence a resistance to what we want 
to achieve. This is demonstrated in the worker who notices his suffering (he lacks 
satisfaction in the way he is treated) and consequently plots a revolution by resisting 
this lack.317 It is in this sense that Sartre states that there cannot be a free pour-soi save 
as engaged in a resistant world. The role of the pour-soi is important here as 
consciousness must be self-aware to separate itself from the given, the en-soi and resist 
the en-soi as guided by the Fundamental Project. Practical success is not defined by 
achieving what one wants but the initiation of choice. For example, the slave is always 
free (ontologically) to try to escape or try to get himself liberated. The past in this case 
becomes important. Although it has already happened and is irremediable, my 
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evaluation of the past is dependent on what it means to me, what I make of it is 
determined by the part it plays in my life. The “resisting attachment” is exhibited in 
my choice to continue a tradition, repudiate or fulfil an engagement and learn from my 
experience or ignore it. My freedom is exhibited practically in wanting to effect a 
change (resisting) in my past.  The change mentioned here refers to facticity as “an 
order of independent indifferent things, partly knowable, partly stable, partly 
alterable.”318 We don’t cause or imagine the resistance. Resistance comes about as a 
result of my confrontation with an actual state of affairs and seeing the potential for 
change and modification.  Blackham explains this in the following. 
 
It is not that I simply interpret the world by my projects, and 
thus give things their co-efficient of adversity of utility; it is 
that I form my projects partly on my experience of the use and 
potentiality of things, and allow for the unforeseeable.319
 
However, the resistance that we want to put up is complicated by the presence of the 
others. This complication does not arise because there is another perspective or that it 
is a different interpretation. Instead, the complication arises because of the perspective 
of others imposed on me, making me their interpreted world. This imposition of the 
projects of others on me  
 
are presented to me as already worked over, utilised, 
standardised for prescribed uses: instead of my giving them 
meaning by my projects, they tell me what to do, and 
therefore, since I am my projects, what I am; and since these 
ready-made meanings and public instructions of an already 
inhabited and organised world are not addressed to me 
personally but to everyone concerned, I am reduced to 
impersonality in adopting or obeying.320
 
 
                                                 
318 Blackham, p. 133 
319 Blackham, p. 133 
320 Blackham, p. 133 
 104
The physical manifestation of freedom here is that I live my participation in the human 
community, as I live my body and my place.321 To quote Sartre, “I am not only thrown 
in front of brute existents, I am thrown into a working class world, French, lorraine or 
méridional, which offers me its meanings without my having done anything to uncover 
them.”322 In spite of the imposition of these standardised meanings, they are not “self-
acting.” They are self-acting only when seen from the outside and from the perspective 
of ego as the second or third person.323 However, the standardised perspectives from 
others are conditions from which I could separate myself and formulate my personal 
project within the standardised world. “It is in order to be a man that one belongs to a 
nation, a class, a family, etc. These are the conditions of one’s projects, which one both 
maintains and surpasses.”324 Language is a good example to illustrate the idea in which 
these imposed meanings are conditions for one’s projects. Though its usage is 
formulable in grammatical rules, the construction of each phrase goes beyond and 
transcends the individual words. Each phrase is denoted by personal intention and this 
is “only possible on the basis of an established usage regulated by rule.”325 In this 
sense, a universal and standardised meaning is a prerequisite for the construction of 
personal meaning. Language is not made by laws but by use. Hence, the resisting of 
conformity to standards or making personal sense of what is imposed on us must take 
place in a context. Ontological freedom has to be exhibited practically as it is in the 
practical context that we construct our personal projects.    
 To summarise, ontological freedom is nothingness or nihilation. We’ve seen in 
the discussion in this section that nihilation connotes the attitude of resistance. Unless 
we resist our facticity and confront our situation (be it a difficult or standardised one), 
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a personal and autonomous choice cannot be exercised. The context is the sufficient 
condition or background (as resistance) for ontological freedom, a platform on which 
we can exercise our freedom. 
 
 
4.2 Practical Freedom is Absolute and Limited 
 
The following is a formulation of the argument that practical freedom is 
absolute and limited.             
5) Practical freedom is limited. 
6) But practical freedom makes sense only against the background of ontological 
freedom. 
7) Ontological freedom is absolute. 
8) Therefore, practical freedom is both limited practically and absolute  
ontologically. 
Practical freedom as explained in premise (4) is limited and it is to be understood in 
the empirical sense of the word. The use of “limit” here, as explained in the previous 
chapter, is not the opposite of “absolute” freedom. “Practical freedom is limited” here 
is also not understood and not being omnipotent, as nowhere in Being and Nothingness 
has Sartre claimed that man can be free (practically) in all circumstances. Practical 
freedom is limited because firstly, it is situated. Practical freedom is observed when it 
rises in the situation of facticity, where man confronts the co-efficient of adversity that 
puts up resistance to what I intend. In fact, Sartre says that freedom can only exist as 
restricted. Secondly, practical freedom is limited as practical freedom is exhibited 
within the parameters of choice or possibilities that comport with his situation. The 
situation is revealed by consciousness. 
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4.2.1 Ontological Freedom as Background for Practical Freedom 
 
 
 Premise (6) refers to the relationship between practical freedom and ontological 
freedom. Ontological freedom is the background against which practical freedom is 
understood. If man is not originally free (ontologically), he is not free at all. 
Ontological freedom is the foundation of practical freedom. Something that is 
foundation to x is necessary to x. Muller’s example of birds not satisfying one of the 
three conditions of freedom326 is useful in helping me explain the necessity of 
ontological freedom to practical freedom. Without ontological freedom, practical 
freedom cannot hold. 
 No one or nothing can be said to be practically free when he/she/it is also 
ontologically free. In Muller’s example, the bird is able to fly and not constrained to do 
so. However, the bird is not practically free. This is so as the bird is not ontologically 
free. Conversely, a bird that is injured is unable to fly, but that does not make it 
practically unfree. It is not practically unfree to fly because it is not ontologically free. 
I am practically free and able to fly, for example, to Melbourne for a holiday because I 
am ontologically free. Conversely, I am not free (practically) to fly to Melbourne for a 
holiday as I have work commitments only because I am ontologically free. Hence, 
ontological freedom is necessary to practical freedom as without being ontological 
freedom, one cannot be practically free or unfree.  
Also, when it was mentioned in (6) that practical freedom only makes sense 
against the background of ontological freedom, I am not referring to a physiological 
but rather, a phenomenological background. If the background were to be 
physiological, it would be an in-itself devoid of a conscious awareness of its being. It 
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is a passivity but the background against which practical freedom can emerge is active 
or, to put it more precisely, an activity.  
 This background is actually being-for-itself or being that is self-conscious. It is 
previously an in-itself that has “awakened” to become aware of consciousness as its 
direct object. Again, this is not to say that consciousness can be objectified as a thing. 
It is an awareness of itself as awareness. Hence, for-itself is action. To understand the 
action of for-itself, the following terms will be helpful in this discussion. These 
seemingly different but equivalent terms are - awareness, intentionality, revelation, 
reflection and nihilation.327 These nouns describe the activity of being-for-itself. 
Awareness is intentional. For-itself is always aware “of” something. “Of” is put in 
parenthesis by Sartre as consciousness is aware of two types of being. Consciousness 
of an object is also consciousness (of) itself. “Every intending act is positionally aware 
of the object it posits and nonpositionally aware (of) itself as awareness.”328 The first 
awareness occurs when consciousness (for-itself) nihilates or separates itself from its 
objects and confers on these objects labels, meanings or characteristics. This awareness 
of objects separates objects from ground and being purely an in-itself. For example, in-
itself, a crag is a mere object but when consciousness becomes aware of the crag as a 
result of intentional projection, the crag could possibly become a wonderful part of its 
surroundings, or one that is difficult to scale.  
The second awareness is a non-positional awareness. It is essentially a self-
awareness where one becomes conscious (of) consciousness. This consciousness (of) 
itself is the negation. The awareness is (of) itself as, firstly, it is not the object of 
consciousness. Secondly, it is, like consciousness, a nothingness, an activity. The 
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interaction between the two kinds of awareness is summarised clearly by Barnes in the 
following. 
 
When Sartre says that the for-itself nihilates nothingness, he 
means simply that the act of being conscious is precisely the 
introduction of the separation of (self) awareness from its 
object and of the object from its ground and, of course, the 




To put it in the way I have been explaining, the structure of consciousness, the first 
awareness is consciousness being not what it is. The second awareness is 
consciousness being what it is not. However, self-awareness must take place before 
consciousness can realise it is not what it is. Hence, to understand freedom, we must 
first understand the activity of self-awareness.  
When Sartre says that consciousness (for-itself) is “a pure negation of the given, and it 
exists as the disengagement  from a certain existing given and as an engagement 
toward a certain not yet existing end”, the nihilation takes place in three dimensions – 
past, present and future. The nihilation in the threefold ekstasis is an “unbroken 
activity.”330 The unbroken activity refers to consciousness striving 331, “to not-be what 
it is (nihilating the past), to be what it is not (reflection reflecting on for-itself as not 
being the object it is reflecting on and for-itself to realise it striving towards a future 
yet to be realised) and to be what it is not and to not-be what it is (for-itself dispersing 
itself in the three temporal dimensions of past, present and future).”  
 In sum, this is the background against which practical freedom can make sense. 
Without the realisation that consciousness is nothingness, we would be mere objects 
(being-it-itself). Practical freedom makes sense when we know that we can be free 
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from our facticity and more importantly, free to strive towards what we intend.  

























5   Conclusion 
 
“Existentialism is not a philosophy but a label for several widely different 
revolts against traditional philosophy.”332 This spirit of repudiating traditional 
philosophy is a distinctive trait in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. We see this in the 
original ways in which Sartre crafts the ideas of consciousness and freedom. A full 
appreciation of his theory of freedom necessitates an understanding of the structure of 
consciousness and his complex and often confusing terminologies.  
The freedom that Sartre is expounding is empowering. We are free to choose 
anything or have any thoughts. Nothing stops us from exhibiting our freedom, not even 
the apparent unchangeable aspects of our life (facticity). Sartre has also shown us that 
freedom is not a given but something we strive for. Like Nietzsche’s overman, we 
must recognise that the power of liberation lies in our own hands. It is our own 
responsibility, not anyone else’s. The starting point of this freedom is the anguished 
awareness of our own freedom. Freedom, like the experience of Roquentin at the start 
of diary, then blossoms into being. 
 
Something has happened to me, I can’t doubt it any more. It 
came as an illness does, not like an ordinary certainty, not like 
anything evident. It came cunningly, little by little; I felt a 
little strange, a little put out, that’s all. Once established it 
never moved, it stayed quiet, and I was able to persuade 
myself that nothing was the matter with me, that it was a false 
alarm. And now, it’s blossoming.333
 
I hope I have, through my explanation of ontological freedom and practical 
freedom, made clear and done justice to Sartre’s idea that “freedom is absolute and 
limited.”  
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To conclude, in my explanation of the two types of freedom in chapters 3 and 4, 
I have: 
• Disagreed with the proponents of the Inconsistent Objection. To them, these 
antithetical strands in his theory of freedom are mutually inconsistent statements 
(“Freedom is absolute and limited”) about the same thing (i.e. freedom). I disagreed 
with them as I think these critics have not been careful in understanding Sartre’s 
terminologies. “Freedom”, “absolute” and “limit” are often interpreted without 
careful consideration of the contexts in which they are used. 
• Disagreed with critics who were more sympathetic towards Sartre’s Theory of 
Freedom. These critics say that there is no inconsistency because what Sartre means 
by “freedom is absolute and limited” is “(ontological) freedom is absolute and 
(practical freedom) is limited.” These critics have correctly observed that Sartre is 
referring to two types of freedom in Being and Nothingness. However, this reading 
of “freedom is absolute and limited” is also not satisfactory as it ignores the 
relationship between ontological and practical freedom. These two types of 
freedom are interdependent.  
• Explained the correct reading of “freedom is absolute and limited”. It should be 
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